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This is a defining moment.  Some of the best opportunities we’ll 
ever have to make a change and save our planet are happening 
right now.  The actions we take—or don’t take—are going to affect 
what happens today and for generations to come.  That is our 
reality right now.  But, there is plenty we can do.1 
We are living in an extraordinary time.  A myriad of social, 
environmental, and economic problems are impacting our country and 
the world including a worldwide recession; global climate change; 
and ongoing wars, famine, and terrorism.  Current problems can be 
traced to industrial behavior that promotes unbridled growth.2  Yet, 
problems can lead to solutions.  For example, developing a 
sustainable hardrock mining and mineral processing industry could 
help moderate uncontrolled growth.  We can create this opportunity 
by embracing the three pillars of sustainable development: 
environmental protection, social equity, and economic prosperity.3  
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines 
sustainability as 
the satisfaction of basic economic, social, and security needs now 
and in the future without undermining the natural resource base and 
environmental quality on which life depends.  From a business 
perspective, the goal of sustainability is to increase long-term 
shareholder and social value, while decreasing industry’s use of 
materials and reducing negative impacts on the environment.4 
Hardrock mining and mineral processing industry reformers are 
looking for sustainable development opportunities because this 
 
1 Posting of Lisa Jackson, Environmental Protection Agency Administrator, to 
Greenversations, http://blog.epa.gov/blog/2009/04/22/celebrate-earth-day-2009/ (Apr. 22, 
2009, 8:25 EST). 
2 See John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Possession: An Essay on Values Necessary for the 
Preservation of Wild Lands and Traditional Tribal Cultures, 40 URB. LAW. 903, 908–09 
(2008) (“It has been suggested that growth—economic, physical, and numerical—is the 
secular religion of America.”) (citing DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM 237 (1976)). 
3 Cf. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, 
LAW, AND SOCIETY 85–88 (3d ed. 2004) (describing the three pillars as a balance between 
“three economies,” where environmental protection is the economy of nature, social equity 
is the civic societal economy, and economic prosperity is the market place economy). 
4 U.S. EPA, Sustainability, Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/sustainability/ 
basicinfo.htm#sustainability (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). 
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industry contributes to our environmental misfortunes.5  This industry 
successfully resists modern environmental law protections, follows 
antiquated mine development rules, and uses waste management 
practices that damage the environment and harm human health.  The 
federal, state, and tribal environmental and natural resource laws and 
regulations exempt hardrock mining and mineral processing facilities 
from reasonable pollution control and allow unsustainable nineteenth 
century mineral activities and industrial behaviors.6  Not surprisingly, 
though promoting industrialization and economic growth, this 
approach has resulted in a horrible parade of human and 
environmental tragedies.7 
Furthermore, these tragedies are global because multinational 
corporations mine, process, and trade minerals worldwide.  For 
example, in the United States, massive asbestos contamination in the 
town of Libby, Montana, caused primarily by W.R. Grace’s 
vermiculite mining and processing activities from 1963 to 1990, 
resulted in the deaths of 200 people and criminal indictments against 
top executives.8  The health effects were so serious that in June 2009 
the EPA declared a public health emergency9 for the first time in the 
 
5 In this Article, hardrock mining and mineral processing refers to gold, silver, lead, 
zinc, phosphate, uranium, and other mineral activities, but excludes coal, oil, and gas 
mineral activities. 
6 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONWIDE 
IDENTIFICATION OF HARDROCK MINING SITES 6 (2004), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/ 2004/20040331-2004-p-00005.pdf. 
7 See, e.g., Teresa Cespedes & Terry Wade, Gold Mine Tailings Dump to be Drained to 
Save Lima Water Supply, MINEWEB, Feb. 5, 2009, http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/ 
view/mineweb/en/page68?oid=77988&sn=Detail (describing measures taken to prevent 
possible contamination of a river that supplies water to Lima, Peru); Dorothy Kosich, 
Newmont Independent Community Relations Study Shows Gaps Between Policy and 
Practice, MINEWEB, Mar. 10, 2009, http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/view/ 
mineweb/en/page68?oid=79911&sn=Detail (describing a study of Newmont Mining 
Company’s community relations policy that revealed a gap existed between its 
implementation in developed versus developing nations). 
8 Associated Press, Charges Issued Over Asbestos at a Mine, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, 
at A16.  Although indicted, four years later the executives were acquitted in May 2009, in 
the presence of perjury allegations against a government witness.  David S. Hilzenrath & 
Carrie Johnson, W.R. Grace Acquitted in Mont. Asbestos Case: 3 Former Officials Also 
Found Not Guilty, WASH. POST, May 9, 2009, at A14. 
9 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9604(a)(4) (2006) (allowing the President to declare “a public health or 
environmental emergency [when] no other person with the authority and capability to 
respond to the emergency will do so in a timely manner”). 
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history of the agency.10  In addition, 99.9% of the children under age 
seven who were tested and live near the Doe Run Resources 
Company, a lead smelter in La Oroya, Peru, had blood lead levels that 
were above the international standard for lead poisoning.11  At another 
Doe Run lead smelter located in Herculaneum, Missouri, lead 
pollution has caused residential relocations, and nearly twenty-five 
percent of children tested have elevated blood lead levels.12  Finally, a 
negligent cyanide spill resulting in fish kills at the Newmont Ahafo 
Gold Mine, in the Asutifi District of Ghana, Africa, highlights the 
pervasiveness and complexity of these situations.13  These atrocities 
are incongruent with sustainability, and nations must take action to 
prevent such outrageous industrial behavior. 
The U.S. government has multiple opportunities for sustainable 
development of the mining industry that would allow for mineral 
activity in appropriate places while still controlling pollution and 
recognizing that ore bodies are finite.  Sustainable development 
requires that hardrock mining proponents and regulators consider, at 
the initial planning stages, the full life cycle of mining and 
 
10 Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Announces Public Health Emergency 
in Libby, Montana; EPA to Move Aggressively on Cleanup and HHS to Assist Area 
Residents with Medical Care (June 17, 2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ 
opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac8525735900400c27/0d16234d252c98f9852575d8005
e63ac!OpenDocument. 
11 Sara Shipley, Doe Run Smelter in Peru Poisons Kids, Study Finds Lead Level in 99.9 
pct. Was Higher Than Global Standard, Report Says, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 10, 
2005, at A5.  Doe Run Resources is a multinational corporation headed by Ira Rennert, a 
New York businessman.  See Michael Shnayerson, Devastating Luxury, VANITY FAIR, 
July 2003, at 128 (describing Mr. Rennert’s international financial successes and the 
extensive pollution caused by his companies). 
12 Chris Carroll & Karen Branch-Brioso, Data Reveal Lead Levels in Herculaneum 
Children; One in 4 Tested Are Contaminated; Gephardt Seeks Action, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 9, 2002, at B4. 
13 See WACAM Ghana, WACAM Chides Newmont Ghana (Oct. 21, 2009),  
http://www.wacamghana.com/index.php/news/view/2/1.  However, news reports differ on 
the effect of the cyanide spill at the Newmont Ahafo Gold Mine in the Ahafo Bongo 
District, Ghana, Africa, on or about October 10, 2009.  Compare id. with Boakye-Dankwa 
Boadi, Of Negligence, Newmont and Cyanide Spillage, GHANAIAN J., Oct. 17, 2009, 
http://www.theghanaianjournal.com/2009/10/17/of-negligence-newmont-and-cyanide-
spillage/.  Meanwhile, the multinational Newmont Mining Company boasts that “[i]n 
2007, Newmont became the first gold company selected to join the Dow Jones 
Sustainability World Index because of the company’s industry-leading environmental and 
social performance.”  Newmont Ghana, Newmont: A Responsible Company in Ghana 
(Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.newmontghana.com/. 
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processing, mine closure, and environmental matters.14  Additionally, 
sustainable development should prohibit mining in certain protected 
places. 
Developing a sustainable mining and mineral processing industry 
with appropriate governmental oversight means (1) enacting 
“necessary legal, fiscal, and environmental policies”15 to support 
strong mining institutions with accountability and transparency,16 and 
(2) establishing clear environmental and social policies, as well as 
compliance standards that achieve rigorous standards of 
environmental and social conduct, which would include providing 
support to local and indigenous populations.17 
Effective governmental oversight of the mining industry can best 
be achieved through an integral approach.  An integral approach 
means that the environmental management and supervision rest in the 
hands of a central environmental agency, for example, the EPA.  
Supervision of environmental management regulatory programs 
should not be sectoral, in other words the supervision should not be 
tied to a government resource “sector, which forms part of the 
development planning scheme.”18  Overseeing mining and mineral 
processing waste management and protection of human health and the 
environment should be the EPA’s responsibility.  On the other hand, 
overseeing mineral development and reclamation on public land is the 
responsibility of federal land management (FLM) agencies, such as 
the U.S. Department of the Interior’s (DOI) Bureau of Land 
 
14 See INDUS. & MINING DIV., INDUS. & ENERGY DEP’T, WORLD BANK, A MINING 
STRATEGY FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN xiv (1996) (“For mining to be 
sustainable, attention must be given to the full cycle.  Mine closure, environmental matters 
and follow up activities must be considered at an early stage.”) [hereinafter WORLD BANK 
REPORT]. 
15 Id. at xiii. 
16 Id. at xiv–xv. 
17 See id. at xvii; see also id. at xviii (“The World Bank Group can assist [Latin 
American and Caribbean countries] address these key sustainability issues through the 
support of macro-economic, legal, institutional and environmental reforms as well as 
providing financing and guarantees for mining projects.”). 
18 Id. at xvii (“[This] report concludes that the integral approach, through an 
environmental government institution (EGI), not tied to any sector, which forms part of the 
development planning scheme, is the most preferred solution to this dilemma.”).  Since 
this advice to developing nations comes from a renowned institution, the World Bank, it is 
equally compelling for developed countries. 
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Management or the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s U.S. Forest 
Service.19 
The U.S. government can readily create a sustainable development 
paradigm for the hardrock mining industry.  The EPA could 
promulgate new environmental regulations under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),20 which would control 
hardrock mining and mineral processing waste management, and 
under the Clean Water Act (CWA),21 which would mitigate the 
discharge of mining waste into the waters of the United States.  
Congress could reinstate the Superfund22 tax and expand it to include 
the hardrock mining industry in order to provide funds to clean up 
abandoned mine sites.  Reforming these environmental laws should 
be an integral approach where the EPA establishes the compliance 
standards similar to the federal minimum technical requirements, 
while state and tribal governments implement the rules under 
cooperative federalism principles.  Additionally, Congress could 
reform the General Mining Law of 1872,23 and the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act24 to regulate hardrock mining and 
mineral processing development activities.  Congressional reforms 
that reclaim, restore, and conserve natural capital would preserve 
treasured national landscapes and protect natural resources from 
mineral exploitation.  Finally, Congress could encourage global 
sustainable development by enacting trade measures to maintain free 
and fair trade in domestic and foreign mineral commodity markets. 
The EPA’s role is essential in this legal reform effort because its 
mission is to protect human health and the environment in the 
national commons by controlling pollution.25  For example, under the 
CWA, the EPA establishes federal minimum standards for water 
 
19 John F. Seymour, Hardrock Mining and the Environment: Issues of Federal 
Enforcement and Liability, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 813 (2004). 
20 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006). 
21 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). 
22 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).  The Superfund Trust fund was originally created from 
special taxes on industry.  Id. § 9611. 
23 General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21–54 (2006). 
24 Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1787 (2006). 
25 U.S. EPA, About EPA, http://www.epa.gov/epahome/aboutepa.htm (last visited Mar. 
5, 2010) (“EPA’s mission is to protect human health and the environment.”). 
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quality,26 and under RCRA, the EPA establishes federal minimum 
standards to protect land and water resources.27  Also, the EPA cleans 
up abandoned waste sites, including abandoned mine lands, under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund).28  Thus, the EPA is the 
quintessential environmental “cop on the beat” that should make and 
enforce the rules, based on congressional directives, for waste 
management at hardrock mining and mineral processing operations.  
Unfortunately, under the current federal environmental laws, the 
government has been off the beat in regulating these industrial wastes. 
Major regulatory reforms and a few statutory changes are 
necessary to control pollution from active and inactive hardrock 
mining and mineral processing operations and abandoned mine lands.  
Parts I, II, and III discuss reforms to RCRA, the CWA, and CERCLA, 
respectively, which would enhance governmental oversight of this 
industry and, in so doing, better protect human health and the 
environment. 
The mineral development laws of the United States,29 including the 
General Mining Law of 1872,30 are so antiquated, that regulatory 
reform alone will be insufficient and statutory changes are necessary.  
Part IV discusses congressional action to reform natural resource laws 
that will preserve treasured national landscapes including sacred sites, 
avoid conflict with federal Indian law, and protect natural capital.  
Part V describes how Congress can encourage sustainable 
development of the U.S. mining and mineral processing industry by 
integrating environmental protection into global trading systems.  
Finally, Part VI concludes that now is the time to take advantage of 
opportunities for government actions to develop a sustainable 
hardrock mining and mineral processing industry.  Sustainable mining 
and mineral processing development is not an oxymoron; this 
industrial sector can develop new behaviors that will protect the 
environment and human health and yet still be profitable. 
I 
RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT (RCRA) 
 
26 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311–1313. 
27 §§ 3002–3005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922–6925 (2006). 
28 §§ 104, 106–07, 120–21, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606–07, 9620–21 (2006). 
29 See, e.g., Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, 30 U.S.C. § 21a (2006). 
30 General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21–54 (2006). 
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REFORM: NEW SPECIAL WASTE REGULATIONS 
The “most dramatic environmental regulatory loophole” for the 
mining and mineral processing industry is the EPA’s failure to 
establish specific regulations to control special wastes.31  For 
example, mining and mineral processing wastes are special wastes, 
which mean they are exempt from the definition of hazardous waste 
under the 1980 Bevill Amendment to RCRA.32  RCRA is a 
multifaceted federal law authorizing the EPA, as well as other federal 
agencies and state partners, to regulate solid wastes including 
municipal, industrial, and hazardous wastes.  Under the Bevill 
Amendment, the EPA exempts from hazardous waste regulation all of 
the solid wastes from the “extraction and beneficiation, and 
processing of ores”33 and twenty specifically listed mineral processing 
wastes.34  Bevill-exempt wastes would otherwise qualify as hazardous 
wastes under RCRA standards and testing protocols.35  For example, 
 
31 See Oversight Hearing to Consider Whether Potential Liability Deters Abandoned 
HardRock Mine Cleanup: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Environment and Public 
Works, 109th Cong. 70 (2006) [hereinafter Senate Oversight Hearing] (statement of 
Velma M. Smith, Senior Policy Associate, National Environmental Trust).  Ms. Smith 
testified that greater regulation of the hardrock mining and mineral processing industry is 
warranted.  Id.  She recommended that Congress “direct[] EPA to establish waste 
regulations specifically crafted for the management of mine waste rock, tailings or other 
mineral-processing wastes, including wastes currently covered by the Bevill amendment.”  
Id. 
32 See Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980 § 3001, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
6921(b)(2)(A), (b)(3)(A), (b)(3)(C), 6982(f), (m)–(p) (2006).  Congressman Thomas 
Bevill and Senator Lloyd Benston proposed these amendments, which required the EPA to 
conduct a study of special wastes including mining and mineral processing and prepare a 
report to Congress to “either determine to promulgate regulations under [the hazardous 
waste management provisions] or determine that such regulations are unwarranted.”  See 
id. § 6921(b)(3)(C); Steven G. Barringer, The RCRA Bevill Amendment: A Lasting Relief 
for Mining Wastes?, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 155, 157 (2003). 
33 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(7) (2009) (“Solid waste from the extraction, beneficiation, and 
processing of ores and minerals (including coal, phosphate rock, and overburden from the 
mining of uranium ore).”). 
34 Id. § 261.4(b)(7)(ii) (“For the purposes of § 261.4(b)(7), solid waste from the 
processing of ores and minerals includes only the following wastes as generated: (A) Slag 
from primary copper processing; (B) Slag from primary lead processing; (C) Red and 
brown muds from bauxite refining; (D) Phosphogypsum from phosphoric acid production; 
(E) Slag from elemental phosphorus production; (F) Gasifier ash from coal gasification      
. . . .”).  This regulation lists twenty wastes in total.  See id. 
35 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921(b)(3), 6982; 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b) (identifying and listing 
hazardous wastes); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20–261.24 (criteria for identifying 
characteristic hazardous wastes incorporating American Society for Testing and Materials 
and EPA test methods). 
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samples of wastes from mining and mineral processing facilities fail 
the toxicity characteristic test for heavy metals, such as lead.36  The 
EPA estimates that approximately seventy percent of mining wastes 
have hazardous characteristics.37  Nevertheless, as a direct result of 
the Bevill Amendment, the EPA promulgated regulations excluding 
mining and mineral processing wastes from the definition of 
hazardous wastes because of their relatively high volume and low 
toxicity characteristics as compared to other hazardous wastes.38  
However, because the EPA remained concerned that Bevill-exempt 
wastes (or special wastes) could cause actual or potential harm, the 
EPA developed a plan to create a special regulation for Bevill-exempt 
 
36 See U.S. EPA, NPL Site Narrative for Newtown County Mine Tailings, 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/nar1677.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (describing 
how “soil sampling indicated surface soil lead contamination as high as 33,500 milligrams 
per kilogram (mg/kg) in the city of Granby” at the Newton County Mine Tailings Site in 
Missouri).  This extremely high number, 33,500 parts per million (ppm), suggests highly 
contaminated soil would be found toxic for lead.  Cf. 40 C.F.R. § 261.24 (“A solid waste . 
. . exhibits the characteristic of toxicity if, using the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching 
Procedure . . . the extract from a representative sample of the waste contains any of the 
contaminants listed in table 1 at the concentration equal to or greater than the respective 
value given in that table,” which lists 5.0 micrograms per liter (mg/L) or ppm as the 
toxicity characteristic level for lead). 
37 Regulatory Determination for Wastes from the Extraction and Beneficiation of Ores 
and Minerals, 51 Fed. Reg. 24,496, 24,498 (July 3, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261) 
(detailing potential hazardous characteristics); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
RISKS POSED BY BEVILL WASTES 2 n.2 (1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/osw/ 
hazard/tsd/ldr/mine/risks.pdf. 
38 See Regulatory Determination for Wastes from the Extraction and Beneficiation of 
Ores and Minerals, 51 Fed. Reg. at 24,496, 24,499 (setting forth the EPA’s determination 
that regulation of mining waste under Subtitle C of RCRA was not warranted at that time 
“based on EPA’s belief that several aspects of EPA’s current hazardous waste 
management standards are likely to be environmentally unnecessary, technically 
infeasible, or economically impractical” due primarily to the high volume of such waste).  
In general, the 1989 rule differentiated between mining wastes from extraction and 
beneficiation and wastes from mineral processing but found that both classifications were 
high volume wastes, while the 1998 rule further clarified that the Bevill exemption for 
mineral processing wastes is limited to the twenty wastes specifically listed at 40 C.F.R. § 
261.4(b)(7), so the exemption applies only to those that meet the high volume, low toxicity 
classification.  See Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1316, 1328–29 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
(“[I]t is clear that Congress did not intend the mining waste exclusion to encompass all 
wastes from primary smelting and refining.  On the contrary, Congress intended the term 
‘processing’ in the Bevill Amendment to include only those wastes from processing ores 
or minerals that meet the ‘special waste’ criteria, that is, ‘high volume, low hazard’ 
wastes.”); Mining Waste Exclusion, 54 Fed. Reg. 36,592, 36,593 (Sept. 1, 1989) (codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261). 
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industrial wastes under state and regional solid waste planning 
authority pursuant to Subtitle D of RCRA.39 
The U.S. government needs to reform the Bevill-exempt waste 
scheme and create a new special waste management program for the 
hardrock mining and mineral processing industry.  Although the EPA 
decided decades ago to develop a special waste management program 
for Bevill-exempt wastes, it has not yet done so.40  Such a program 
could rely on authority given to the EPA under RCRA to develop 
modified requirements of special wastes under section 3004(x), 
entitled “mining and other special wastes,” (also known as the 1984 
Simpson Amendment)41 to protect human health and the 
environment.42  The EPA’s own Inspector General encouraged that 
agency to develop a regulatory program to control special wastes, 
which could be a program under section 3004(x).43 
The Simpson Amendment to RCRA applies to special wastes, 
including mining and mineral processing wastes among others.44  The 
 
39 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941–6949a; Regulatory Determination for Wastes from the 
Extraction and Beneficiation of Ores and Minerals, 51 Fed. Reg. at 24,496 (explaining that 
the agency “is concerned about certain actual and potential mining waste problems, and 
therefore plans to develop a program for mining waste under Subtitle D of RCRA,” which 
sets forth the state and regional solid waste plans). 
40 See Regulatory Determination for Wastes from the Extraction and Beneficiation of 
Ores and Minerals, 51 Fed. Reg. at 24,496 (“The Administration will work with Congress 
to develop expanded Subtitle D authority (i.e., Federal oversight and enforcement) to 
support an effective State-implemented program for mining waste.”); see also Barringer, 
supra note 32, at 155 (describing how RCRA still exempts many wastes from regulation); 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA CAN DO MORE TO HELP 
MINIMIZE HARDROCK MINING LIABILITIES 16 (1997) [hereinafter EPA AUDIT 1997], 
available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/1997/7100223.pdf (“EPA has recognized for 
some years that it needed a more coordinated approach to effectively deal with hardrock 
mining issues.  However, EPA has yet to develop it.”). 
41 See Barringer, supra note 32, at 157. 
42 42 U.S.C. § 6924(x) (authorizing the EPA to modify requirements if solid waste from 
the extraction, beneficiation or processing of ores and minerals “is subject to regulation 
under [RCRA’s hazardous waste management section] . . . so long as such modified 
requirements assure protection of human health and the environment”). 
43 See EPA AUDIT 1997, supra note 40, at 15.  For example, the Office of Inspector 
General stated that the EPA has “not pursued development of a mining waste regulatory 
program under RCRA,” nor has it promulgated special waste management and disposal 
regulations despite its authority under section 3004(x) of RCRA to regulate and prevent 
serious environmental damage from hardrock mining facilities.  Id. 
44 42 U.S.C. § 6924(x) (defining special wastes as including wastes from extraction, 
beneficiation, or mineral processing of ores and minerals; wastes from combustion of coal 
and fossil fuels; and cement kiln dust waste).  Unfortunately, special wastes have caused  
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EPA has determined that special wastes are typically generated in 
mountainous volumes (over 50,000 metric tons per facility per year) 
and exhibit relatively low toxicity compared to other hazardous 
wastes.45  Under the Simpson Amendment, the EPA has authority to 
adapt RCRA’s hazardous waste regulations to accommodate the high 
volume and low toxicity characteristic of special wastes.46  
Adaptation is necessary because imposing the full panoply of RCRA 
hazardous waste regulations, such as minimum technology disposal 
requirements,47 is impractical and too costly for special wastes.48  For 
example, the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 
require “the installation of two or more liners and a leachate 
collection system above (in the case of a landfill) and between such 
 
significant harm to health and the environment, for example, the major coal combustion 
ash waste disaster at the Kinston Facility in Harriman, Tennessee, that resulted in fish kills 
and destruction of homes.  Shaila Dewan, Tennessee Ash Flood Larger Than Initial 
Estimate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at A10.  The Obama administration is evaluating 
new regulations for special wastes.  See Obama Keeping Secret Locations of Coal Ash 
Sites, MSNBC NEWS, June 12, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31327223/ns/ 
us_news-environment/ (“The EPA is currently considering regulating the waste, but it is 
unclear whether the agency will classify it as hazardous or regulate it like household 
waste.”). 
45 Mining Waste Exclusion, 54 Fed. Reg. 36,592, 36,597 (Sept. 1, 1989) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 261) (discussing low hazard criterion based on EPA Method 1312—Synthetic 
Precipitation Leaching Procedure); id. at 36,607 (setting forth high volume criterion). 
46 See EPA AUDIT 1997, supra note 40, at 15. 
47 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939e (including mandating use of double liners, leachate 
controls, and groundwater monitoring). 
48 See Regulatory Determination for Wastes from the Extraction and Beneficiation of 
Ores and Minerals, 51 Fed. Reg. 24,496, 24,498 (July 3, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
261) (“The Report to Congress presented for five metal mining segments, total annualized 
costs ranging from $7 million per year (for a scenario that emphasizes primarily basic 
maintenance and monitoring for wastes that are hazardous under the current RCRA 
criteria) to over $800 million per year (for an unlikely scenario that approximates a full 
RCRA Subtitle C regulatory approach, emphasizing cap and liner containment for all 
wastes considered hazardous under the current criteria, plus cyanide and acid formation 
wastes).”). 
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liners.”49  The Simpson Amendment relaxes these stringent statutory 
provisions.50 
A new special waste management program is necessary because 
the EPA’s Bevill-exempt waste scheme has failed to prevent or 
mitigate environmental damage and associated health risks.  Since 
1986, the EPA has intended to create a RCRA Subtitle D+ Program51 
by promulgating new regulations and by modifying state and regional 
solid waste management plans in order to regulate Bevill-exempt 
wastes.52  However, the regulations, known as the “Strawman I and 
II” were never promulgated because the EPA simply does not have 
permitting or enforcement authorities under RCRA Subtitle D, the 
solid waste program.53  Meanwhile, toxic industrial wastes from 
hardrock mining and twenty mineral processing facilities are merely 
regulated under the solid waste program, which is inadequate to 
protect human health and the environment from harm due to these 
wastes.54 
After decades of diminishing efforts,55 a new approach is necessary 
to replace the Bevill-exempt waste scheme because the EPA has 
 
49 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o)(1)(A)(i); Regulatory Determination for Wastes from the 
Extraction and Beneficiation of Ores and Minerals, 51 Fed. Reg. at 24,500 (“[C]ertain 
Subtitle C requirements such as single and double liner system requirements which 
provide liquid management, and closure and capping standards to minimize infiltration, 
may be technically infeasible or economically impractical to implement for mining wastes 
because of the quantity and nature of waste involved.”). 
50 See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(x) (authorizing the EPA to modify this section’s requirements 
“to take into account the special characteristics of such [mining and other special] 
wastes”). 
51 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, RCRA REGULATION IMPACT ON ALASKA MINERAL 
DEVELOPMENT: WASTE ROCK MANAGEMENT 16 (1992) (“EPA has not initiated the rule-
making process to develop solid waste regulations for the management of tailings and 
waste rock. . . . EPA declared its intent to develop a specific program for mining wastes 
which it has described as a Subtitle D+ program.  The D+ notation implies that it would be 
a regulatory program that is more stringent than the Subtitle D solid waste program . . . .”). 
52 Barringer, supra note 32, at 191. 
53 Id. at 191–92 (describing the EPA’s two attempts at “draft conceptual framework[s] 
for Bevill-exempt mining wastes” in 1988 and 1990, and how “EPA remains without 
enforcement and permitting tools that presumably it would need to implement a regulatory 
program under RCRA Subtitle D.”); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RISKS POSED 
BY BEVILL WASTES, supra note 37, at 3. 
54 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RISKS POSED BY BEVILL WASTES, supra note 37, at 4 
(“The Agency continues to believe that mining waste poses a broad range of 
environmental risk.  Some types of mines and waste management practices pose very little 
risks while others pose significant environmental problems and threats to human health.”). 
55 See id. at 2–4. 
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apparently abandoned the unworkable Subtitle D+ Program.  Senator 
Simpson’s brainchild, section 3004(x) of RCRA, is well suited for a 
new special wastes program.  As early as 1986, the EPA decided that, 
if Subtitle D is unworkable, section 3004(x) of RCRA could be used 
to modify the hazardous waste regulations because it provides ample 
permitting and enforcement authority to create a flexible waste 
management program that could address the high volume and low 
toxicity levels characteristic of mining and mineral processing 
wastes.56 
Other mining industry reformers suggest repeal of the Bevill 
Amendment and regulating all mining and mineral processing wastes 
as hazardous.57  However, that legal solution results in technically 
complex implementation problems and overregulation because 
minimum technology controls are too stringent for the mountains of 
relatively low toxicity wastes that are generated at extremely high 
annual rates.58  In contrast, section 3004(x) authority provides 
flexibility, works without legislative repeal or amendment to RCRA, 
and the EPA has planned for this eventuality.59 
Equally important, a section 3004(x) hardrock mining and mineral 
processing waste program would resolve an overregulation problem 
for certain mineral processing wastes.  The new 3004(x) program 
would regulate all extraction and beneficiation mining wastes, but not 
 
56 Regulatory Determination for Wastes from the Extraction and Beneficiation of Ores 
and Minerals, 51 Fed. Reg. 24,496, 24,496–24,501 (July 3, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
261) (“If EPA is unable to develop an effective mining waste program under Subtitle D, 
the Agency may find it necessary to use Subtitle C authority in the future. . . . Initially, 
EPA will use this information [from the mining industry] to develop a program under 
Subtitle D.  The information, however, may indicate the need to reconsider Subtitle C for 
certain mining wastes. . . . [T]he Agency may find that the Subtitle D approach is 
unworkable, perhaps because there is insufficient authority to implement an effective 
program (i.e., the Agency does not obtain [from Congress] oversight and enforcement 
authority under Subtitle D), or that States lack adequate resources to develop and 
implement the program.  In such an event, EPA may find it necessary to reexamine use of 
Subtitle C authority with modified mining waste standards in the future.”); see supra notes 
38–40, 49–50. 
57 E.g., Bart Lounsbury, Comment, Digging Out of the Holes We've Made: Hardrock 
Mining, Good Samaritans, and the Need for Comprehensive Action, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 149, 207–08 (2008) (“The solution to this environmentally detrimental lack of 
regulatory authority is simple: repeal the Bevill Amendment and start regulating all 
hazardous mining byproducts.”). 
58 See supra notes 49–50. 
59 See supra notes 38, 43, and accompanying text. 
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necessarily all twenty of the mineral processing wastes.60  A new 
3004(x) program would regulate eleven of these twenty wastes by 
modifying and flexibly applying the appropriate Subtitle C 
requirements.  Nevertheless, the other nine mineral processing wastes 
may be appropriately regulated as nonhazardous, solid wastes because 
they pose few, if any, risks.61  Applying the new special waste 
program to these nine wastes could be considered overregulation.  
However, such overregulation could be avoided by carefully 
analyzing the characteristics, management practices, and risks 
associated with these nine processing wastes.  The EPA would decide 
whether or not and which ones, if any, to include in the new program. 
A.  Benefits of a RCRA Special Waste Management Program for 
Hardrock Mining and Mineral Processing Industry 
Developing a RCRA special waste management program for toxic 
wastes from hardrock mining and mineral processing facilities has 
many advantages.  The benefits of a RCRA special waste program 
include: (1) easy to draft regulations, (2) financial assurances to 
protect the environment, and (3) national consistency for states and 
tribes.  This program would also ensure federal, state, and tribal 
government compliance with RCRA.62  States may implement EPA-
approved RCRA hazardous waste programs provided their programs 
are enforceable and no less stringent than federal minimum criteria.63  
RCRA also applies to public and private lands.64  Finally, RCRA is a 
multimedia statute that protects surface water, ground water, 
 
60 See Final Regulatory Determination for Special Wastes from Mineral Processing 
(Mining Waste Exclusion), 56 Fed. Reg. 27,300 (June 13, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
261) (finding that a modified Subtitle D program would be appropriate for eighteen of the 
twenty mineral processing wastes and that a modified hazardous waste program (C-Minus) 
may be economically damaging in many cases); see also id. at 27,323 (“For example, in 
some cases, adequately protective design and operating standards for new waste 
management units under Subtitle C-Minus and D-Plus have been defined by EPA to be 
identical.”). 
61 Id. at 27,325. 
62 For example, RCRA holds criminally liable any “person,” who is in violation of that 
Act, defining “person” to include municipal, state, and federal governments, and 
“municipal” to include Indian tribes and Alaskan Native villages/organizations.  §§ 
1004(13), 1004(15), 3008(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(13), 6903(15), 6928(a) (2006). 
63 Id. § 6926(b). 
64 Id. § 6901(b). 
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sediments, and land.65  Also, using available RCRA authority under 
section 3004(x) to make a regulatory change would be easier and 
faster than creating a statutory amendment to another law and creating 
a whole new program, as some legislators have proposed,66 especially 
if the other statutes only apply to federal lands or coal mining. 
1.  Easy to Draft New Regulations 
The special waste management program regulations would be easy 
to draft because the EPA could adopt previously promulgated 
hazardous waste storage and disposal requirements, including 
permits, closure and post-closure standards, financial assurances, 
corrective action standards, manifests, and enforcement provisions 
with penalties.67  The more onerous land disposal regulatory 
provisions, such as minimum technology and ground water 
monitoring systems, could be modified based on site-specific factors, 
including geography, physical conditions of facilities, nearby 
populations, and sensitive ecosystems.68  Also, the language from the 
1990 Strawman draft regulation could be easily revised for this new 
program.69 
2.  Financial Assurances Protect Government Reserves 
The special waste program could adopt RCRA financial assurance 
requirements for closure and post-closure activities to ensure that the 
hardrock mining and mineral processing industry fully internalizes the 
costs of toxic waste management.  Insufficient financial assurance has 
 
65 Id. §§ 6901(b)(2), 6901(b)(4), 6902(a)(10), 6924(u), 6924(v). 
66 See generally Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2009, S. 796, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (amending existing law and proposing establishment of new funds for restoration 
of land and water resources). 
67 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922–6925, 6928, 6973. 
68 Regulatory Determination for Wastes from the Extraction and Beneficiation of Ores 
and Minerals, 51 Fed. Reg. 24,496, 24,498 (July 3, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261) 
(“The actual human health and environmental threat posed by any of these releases is 
largely dependent upon site-specific factors, including a site’s proximity to human 
populations or sensitive ecosystems.  Sites well removed from population centers, drinking 
water supplies, and surface waters are not likely to pose high risks.”). 
69 See generally OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STRAWMAN 
II: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A REGULATORY PROGRAM FOR MINING WASTE AND 
MATERIALS UNDER SUBTITLE D OF THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT 
1 (1990) [hereinafter STRAWMAN II] (setting forth a working draft of proposed informal 
regulations for “a program to protect human health and the environment from the problems 
that may be associated with noncoal mining wastes and other materials”). 
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been a systemic problem at hardrock mining sites on private and 
public lands,70 and has resulted in the failure to cover the costs of 
waste storage and disposal as well as mine reclamation.  In addition, 
“adequate financial assurances must be incorporated in hardrock mine 
permits to ensure protection of human health and the environment and 
minimize future cleanup costs.”71 
Financial assurances under RCRA distinguish closure costs for 
protection of health and the environment, from costs stemming from 
natural resource laws that require bonding to cover the reclamation 
and restoration of natural resources.72  The latter may be appropriate 
for separate regulation under DOI statutes, see infra Part IV.B.  
Although other FLM agencies have proposed financial assurance 
rules to cover potential environmental harms, their authorizing 
legislation lacks specificity to impose substantial environmental 
protections that would prevent irreparable harm.73  For example, DOI 
financial assurance regulations do not necessarily protect public lands 
and waters from the potential release of dangerous waste materials 
into the environment.74  RCRA is clear and unambiguous; financial 
 
70 U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HARDROCK MINING: INFORMATION ON 
ABANDONED MINES AND VALUE AND COVERAGE OF FINANCIAL ASSURANCES ON BLM 
LAND 2–3 (2008) [hereinafter SENATE HEARING ON HARDROCK MINING] (statement of 
Robin M. Nazzaro, Director, Natural Resources and Environment) (reporting that financial 
assurances on federal lands were insufficient). 
71 EPA AUDIT 1997, supra note 40, at 7. 
72 See generally § 3004(a)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a)(6) (2006) (mandating that the EPA 
promulgate regulations with respect to requirements for “financial responsibility 
(including financial responsibility for corrective action) as may be necessary or 
desirable”); id. § 6928(h) (permitting financial assurances for corrective action); 40 C.F.R. 
§ 265.143 (requiring financial assurances for closure); EPA AUDIT 1997, supra note 40, at 
8. 
73 See Seymour, supra note 19, at 839–53.  Specifically, the Department of the Interior 
(DOI) believes the General Mining Law of 1872 and the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act “[t]aken together . . . clearly authorize regulation of environmental 
impacts of mining through measures such as mitigation.”  Id. at 843 n.232 (quoting Mining 
Claims Under the General Mining Law; Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 
70,012 (Nov. 21, 2000) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 2090, 2200, 2710, 2740, 3800 and 
9260)).  However, DOI regulations are insufficient because they set a general management 
standard that prevents only “unnecessary or undue degradation.”  See 43 C.F.R. § 3809.1 
(2009).  At least, the DOI regulations require compliance with state and federal 
environmental law.  Seymour, supra note 19, at 843.  However, when mining operators are 
not constrained by mandatory environmental laws, DOI regulatory controls function to 
minimize and prevent contamination only when practicable, see id. at 841–43, 851, which 
is insufficient to protect human health and the environment. 
74 EPA AUDIT 1997, supra note 40, at 7. 
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assurances must be sufficient to cover closure and post-closure costs 
associated with hazardous waste management units to protect health 
and the environment at any property, whether private, state, tribal, or 
federal.75 
3.  National Consistency, State Implementation, and Tribal Issues 
RCRA allows states to implement hazardous waste management 
programs, which reflects an ideal form of cooperative federalism.  All 
of the fifty states would be eligible for an EPA-approved special 
waste program.76  A minimum level of federal protection and national 
consistency would be assured because, although State programs can 
be broader and more stringent than the EPA’s federal RCRA 
program, they cannot be less stringent.77 
At present, many states have developed mining and mineral 
management laws that are not uniform and not protective of the 
environment.78  Federal guidance and oversight under a new RCRA 
special waste program would ensure more national consistency for the 
benefit of industry.  For example, both federal minimum 
 
75 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a)(6), (t).  However, in general DOI regulates mining on public 
lands, not private.  See General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 26 (2006) (governing 
mining locations situated on the public domain).  Also, DOI rules require only minimal 
financial assurances for harm to public lands.  EPA AUDIT 1997, supra note 40, at 8–9. 
76 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (“Any State which seeks to administer and enforce a hazardous 
waste program pursuant to this subchapter may develop and . . . submit to the [EPA] 
Administrator an application . . . for authorization of such program.”).  Unlike RCRA, the 
proposed Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2009 unfairly provides more funding 
and special authorizations for fourteen western states to implement a program for 
abandoned mine land (AML) cleanup.  Compare id. with S. 796, 111th Cong. §§ 401(e), 
402(a) (2009).  Specifically, Senate bill 796 defines the term “abandoned hardrock mine 
State” to mean each of the States of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, 
and Wyoming.  Id. § 2(1).  Thus, the bill allows these fourteen states to receive 
preapproval of their existing state reclamation programs, see id. § 401(e); allows these 
states to receive funds from a new federal hardrock reclamation fund, see id. § 402(a); and 
also limits other states to only ten percent of the fund, see id. §§ 402(b)(4), 402(e).  
Although the majority of AML may be found in the western states, the proposed law is 
unfair to the Midwestern, Southeastern, and Eastern states that also have significant 
numbers of AML sites.  Cf. U.S. EPA, AML CERCLIS Inventory, http://www.epa.gov/ 
aml/amlsite/ nonnpl.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
77 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b); 40 C.F.R. §§ 271.1(i), 271.4 (2009) (allowing states to provide 
more stringent requirements or ones effectively broader in scope unless inconsistent with 
the federal program). 
78 See EPA AUDIT 1997, supra note 40, at 9–10, see also Senate Oversight Hearing, 
supra note 31, at 15 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer, California) (describing an example 
of “a well-intentioned cleanup effort gone wrong”). 
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environmental performance standards and uniform financial assurance 
requirements would help avoid a race to the bottom where states relax 
environmental standards hoping to lure or retain industry jobs.79  
Effectively, uniform minimum federal standards and requirements 
would level the playing field for states and bring consistency to the 
industry. 
Additionally, the new special waste program would apply in Indian 
country, where the EPA would implement the program to assure 
national consistency.  Tribes are not eligible to implement RCRA in 
the same manner as states because RCRA defines tribal governments 
as municipalities.80  Thus, tribes could not implement the new special 
waste program.  A statutory correction to this definition would be 
necessary for the EPA to authorize tribal governments.  Moreover, 
Subtitle D does not authorize the EPA to implement permitting or 
enforcement of state solid waste programs because only states have 
implementing authority.81  Thus, creating a new special waste 
program under Subtitle C of RCRA would fill a regulatory gap where 
neither the EPA nor tribal governments have authority under Subtitle 
D to implement an enforceable waste management program for 
mining and mineral processing wastes in Indian country.82 
 
79 At least two state governments, Alaska and California, have environmental 
performance standards and financial assurances for hardrock mining site closure.  See EPA 
AUDIT 1997, supra note 40, at 9.  In general though, state requirements are not uniform 
and may be insufficient to provide minimal levels of environmental protection.  Id. at 9–
11. 
80 42 U.S.C. § 6903(13) (defining tribes as municipalities); id. § 6904 (mandating 
cooperation with state agencies).  RCRA has no provision authorizing tribes to be treated 
as states as other environmental laws do; therefore, tribes are not accorded the same rights 
as states under RCRA.  Compare id. §§ 6901–6996k with Clean Water Act § 518(e), 33 
U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2006) (providing tribes the same treatment as states).  In addition, the 
EPA has to exercise caution in interpreting silent or ambiguous statutes.  See Backcountry 
Against Dumps v. EPA, 100 F.3d 147, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that RCRA defines 
Indian tribes as municipalities, not states; therefore, the statute’s authorization for EPA 
approval of state permitting plan does not apply to tribes). 
81 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941–6949a (authorizing states to regulate solid waste landfills and 
setting forth minimum standards for state or regional solid waste plans).  In general, 
RCRA limits the EPA’s solid waste authority to enforcement at open dumps and cases of 
imminent and substantial endangerment.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6943(a)(3), 6945, 6973; 40 
C.F.R. pt. 257 (setting forth criteria for classification of solid waste facilities and 
practices). 
82 See 42 U.S.C. § 6945(c)(2); Memorandum from the Office of Civil Enforcement, 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency to its Regional Counsels et al., 1 (Mar. 30, 2007), 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/rcra/rcrasection4005c2-guidance 
.pdf (providing “Guidance on Using RCRA Section 4005(c)(2) to Address Uncontrolled  
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B.  Pitfalls to Avoid 
A new special wastes management program must preserve the 
integrity of RCRA and other environmental laws.  For example, 
weaknesses in the 1990 draft Bevill waste regulations, referred to as 
Strawman II, distorted RCRA and CERCLA regulatory programs.83  
Strawman II proposed to regulate all twenty mineral processing 
wastes and other nonhazardous wastes “co-located and commingled 
with regulated materials generated by extraction and beneficiation.”84  
The draft recommendations for a regulatory program exempted 
voluntary remining activities from CERCLA liability, failed to define 
federally enforceable numeric performance standards, and provided 
constrained federal oversight of EPA-authorized state programs.85  
These pitfalls could be easily avoided.  For example, the EPA’s 2007 
Good Samaritan Initiative eliminates any need to modify CERCLA 
liability for volunteers who remine wastes at abandoned mine sites.86  
Inconsistent state requirements87 are readily resolved by establishing 
uniform financial assurance rules and federal minimum 
 
Waste Dumps in Indian Country”).  The EPA’s guidance allows regional counsels to use 
enforcement authorities under Subtitle C of RCRA to take enforcement actions at solid 
waste landfills in Indian country in limited circumstances.  Id. 
83 See, e.g., STRAWMAN II, supra note 69, at 21–22, 27 (setting forth the Strawman II 
framework which could have limited EPA enforcement in ways inconsistent with authority 
under Subtitle C of RCRA, and proposing modification to CERCLA to promote voluntary 
remining or closure by limiting liability for third parties who wish to remine at abandoned 
sites). 
84 Id. at 28–29. 
85 Id. at 20, 27, 37. 
86 See Memorandum from the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance et al., 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency to its Regional Administrators et al., at 3–4 (June 6, 2007) 
(setting forth “Interim Guiding Principles for Good Samaritan Projects at Orphan Mine 
Sites and Transmittal of CERCLA Administrative Tools for Good Samaritans” that 
eliminate need to amend CERCLA for remining operations by providing for a qualifying 
Good Samaritan to avoid CERCLA liability); see also Lounsbury supra note 57, at 214 
(concluding that “existing alternatives to the liability relief provisions of Good Samaritan 
legislation probably suffice to enable Good Samaritan mine remediation.  Certainly, with 
its new model documents, EPA has begun to clear the way for Good Samaritans without 
creating dangerous blanket exemptions from environmental laws.”).  But see Senate 
Oversight Hearing, supra note 31, at 64 (statement of Velma M. Smith, Senior Policy 
Associate, National Environmental Trust) (recommending no amendment to CERCLA for 
Good Samaritan cleanups). 
87 See generally James R. Kuipers & Sarah Zuzulock, Financial Assurance for 
Hardrock Mine Cleanup, Presentation at Western Mining Activist Network, Vancouver 
(Oct. 3–5, 2003) (presenting case studies that show significant differences in state 
hardrock mine cleanup financial assurance requirements), http://www.csp2.org/ 
REPORTS/Financail%20Assurance%20for%20Hardrock%20Mine%20Cleanup.pdf. 
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environmental protection standards for all states and Indian country, 
as well as clear federal oversight responsibilities for the EPA. 
C.  Collaboration with Other Special Waste Programs 
The new special waste program should be coordinated inside the 
government using a broad approach that involves a number of special 
wastes and different offices within the EPA, not just the mining and 
mineral processing waste experts.  EPA rulemaking is underway for 
the regulation of other special wastes including cement kiln dust and 
coal combustion ash,88 as well as the use of recovered mineral 
component in cement or concrete projects.89  Also, the 2007 chat rule 
authorizes and encourages the use of certain mining wastes in federal 
 
88 Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Announces Plans to Regulate Coal 
Ash / Agency Proposals Would Address Risks of Unsafe Coal Ash Disposal, While 
Supporting Safe Forms of Beneficial Use (May 4, 2010).  Cement kiln dust and coal 
combustion ash (CCA) could be regulated under section 3004(x) of RCRA.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6924(x) (2006).  One option under the proposed rule is to rely on Subtitle C, which 
creates a comprehensive program of federally enforceable requirements for waste 
management and disposal.  See Press Release, U. S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra.  
Fortunately, the EPA is preparing regulations for CCA, but only after well-publicized 
catastrophes of CCA spilling into rivers.  See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Hundreds of Coal Ash 
Dumps Lack Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, at A1.  In March 2009, the EPA issued 
information request letters to dozens of facilities that manage CCA, and interestingly, used 
CERCLA information gathering authorities rather than RCRA.  See, e.g., Letter from 
Barry N. Breen, Acting Assistant Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency to Plant Manager, 
Gorgas Power Station, Ala. (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/osw//nonhaz/industrial/ 
special/fossil/coalashletter.htm.  In November 2009, the news media reported that four 
environmental groups filed a notice of intent to sue CCA facilities under the Clean Water 
Act.  Maryland Coal Ash Landfill Leaks Trigger Lawsuit Threat, ENVTL. NEWS SERV., 
Nov. 22, 2009, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/nov2009/2009-11-22-093.asp. 
89 See Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for 
Users, § 6017, Pub. L. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1888-90 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 6961–6964) 
(“Increased use of recovered mineral component in federally funded projects involving 
procurement of cement or concrete.”); see generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY ET AL., 
STUDY ON INCREASING THE USAGE OF RECOVERED MINERAL COMPONENTS IN 
FEDERALLY FUNDED PROJECTS INVOLVING PROCUREMENT OF CEMENT OR CONCRETE TO 
ADDRESS THE SAFE, ACCOUNTABLE, FLEXIBLE, EFFICIENT TRANSPORTATION EQUITY 
ACT: A LEGACY FOR USERS ES-1 (2008), http://www.epa.gov/osw/conserve/tools/cpg/ 
pdf/rtc/report4-08.pdf (reporting to Congress agencies’ analysis and conclusions regarding 
“energy savings and environmental benefits associated with” recovered mineral 
components, including special wastes such as CCA, as well identification of the barriers 
and “potential mechanisms to achieve greater substitution of [such] revovered mineral 
components.”); U.S. EPA, Special Wastes, http://www.epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial/ 
special/index.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
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highway projects.90  In addition, the EPA is considering, but has not 
yet decided on an administrative petition91 to reconsider the October 
2008 final rule that excluded recycled hazardous wastes from 
compliance with hazardous waste regulations.92  Specifically, that rule 
excluded certain wastes, including mineral processing wastes, from 
the definition of a solid waste if they had been recycled and redefined 
these wastes as secondary materials.93  All these rules could be 
harmonized by a “Special Waste Regulatory Strategy” initiative that 
would effectively regulate the entire special waste category. 
Moreover, if the EPA does not regulate special wastes, Congress is 
considering action, particularly on coal combustion ash waste.  As 
Congressman Rahall stated, “[T]here are no federal standards for coal 
ash impoundments.  They are constructed and maintained under a 
patchwork of State requirements, or on a voluntary basis.”94  
 
90 See Criteria for the Safe and Environmentally Protective Use of Granular Mine 
Tailings Known as “Chat”, 72 Fed. Reg. 39,331 (July 18, 2007) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
260, 278).  As an example of why the United States should have nationally consistent, 
environmentally protective regulations, see Special Report: Lead in Our Roadways 
(KCTV5 video broadcast Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.kctv5.com/video/22738608. 
91 See U.S. EPA, DSW Federal Register Notices, http://www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/dsw/ 
rulemaking.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
92 See Revisions to the Definition of Solid Waste, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,668 (Oct. 30, 2008) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 260, 261, and 270); see also Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 73–75 (2005) 
(statement of Scott Slesinger, Vice President for Gov’t Affairs, Environmental Technology 
Council) (testifying that the proposed hazardous waste recycling rule would be detrimental 
to the environment, “fail to adequately protect public health” and possibly cause “the 
economic incentive to dump the waste along the road [to] return for the first time since 
1976”).  Nevertheless, the EPA issued the final rule in October 2008.  See Aaron M. Cohn 
& Amy L. Edwards, EPA Issues Final Rule Redefining “Solid Waste,” Thereby 
Generating Substantial Industry Cost Savings, ENV’T NEWSL. (Holland & Knight, San 
Francisco, Cal.), Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.hklaw.com/id24660/PublicationId2523/ 
ReturnId31/contentid53480/ (providing a positive critique of this rule, but noting 
comments received expressed a “worry that companies will avoid RCRA by engaging in 
sham recycling”). 
93 Cf. Revisions to the Definition of Solid Waste, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,680 (explaining 
how the final rule “excludes from the definition of solid waste those hazardous secondary 
materials which remain under the control of the generator when legitimately reclaimed”); 
40 C.F.R. § 261.10 (2009) (defining hazardous secondary material). 
94 155 CONG. REC. E82 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 2009) (statement of Rep. Rahall) 
(introducing new legislation to control coal ash, he stated: “Just a few weeks ago, in 
December, a facility owned by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) gave way, 
unleashing an avalanche of coal ash sludge that covered more than 300 acres.  This time 
Heaven intervened, and thankfully no lives were lost.  This disaster—which could have 
been avoided if TVA had exercised appropriate engineering and monitoring regimes at its 
Kingston facility in Harriman, Tennessee—was a clarion call for action.  Now is the time  
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Meanwhile, the release of toxic coal ash sludge is killing fish and 
threatening human health and welfare,95 and citizens are filing 
lawsuits to force some action.96 
D.  RCRA Reform Summary 
Sustainable development of the hardrock mining and mineral 
processing industry requires protecting health and the environment 
through government regulation.  The EPA can readily promulgate a 
special waste management program using authority conferred by 
section 3004(x) of RCRA for the mining and mineral processing 
industry.  A new program would end decades of underregulation of 
this industry and provide nationally consistent environmental 
protections and uniform financial assurances to cover potential 
insolvent operations on public, private, and Indian country.  This 
RCRA reform would protect all media, including soil, air, surface 
water, sediments, and groundwater, from active and inactive 
industrial mining and mineral processing operations.  Finally, as part 
of a special waste regulatory strategy, this program could be 
combined with ongoing reforms for coal ash and cement kiln dust 
wastes. 
II 
CLEAN WATER ACT (CWA) REFORM: LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION 
The two most significant water pollution regulatory mechanisms 
ripe for reforms to improve water quality at mining and mineral 
processing facilities are the EPA’s National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit program97 and the U.S. Army 
 
to take that action, before any lives are lost to a similar disaster.  Simply put, there are no 
federal standards for coal ash impoundments.  They are constructed and maintained under 
a patchwork of State requirements, or on a voluntary basis.”). 
95 See supra notes 44, 88, and accompanying text. 
96 Press Release, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, Tennessee Family Files 
Lawsuit Against Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Seeking Medical and Environmental 
Testing (Jan. 12, 2009), available at http://eon.businesswire.com/news/eon/ 
20090112005639/en/Kingson-environmental-disaster/TVA-coal-ash-spill/TVA-spill. 
97 Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006) (setting forth the NPDES 
permitting program that establishes national standards for the protection of surface waters 
based on technology and water quality-based effluent limitations for the discharge of 
pollutants into waters of the United States); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MINING 
AND MINERAL PROCESSING COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE RESOURCES FOR THE GOLD AND  
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Corps of Engineers’ (Army Corps) 404 permit program for the 
discharge of dredge and fill material.98  The U.S. government relies 
heavily on CWA regulation and enforcement to protect surface waters 
from toxic mining wastes, especially acid mine drainage.99  
Unfortunately, these CWA programs have been assaulted in recent 
years by regulatory rollbacks100 and Supreme Court opinions that 
limit their effectiveness.101  Reforming the CWA and its 
implementing regulations could substantially improve water quality at 
hardrock mining and mineral processing facilities. 
A.  Redefine the CWA Definition of Fill Material 
The CWA regulations defining fill material were revised in 2002 
under a joint regulation from the Army Corps and the EPA.102  The 
new definition has come under intense scrutiny because it creates 
confusion and a conflict exists between the NPDES and the 404 
 
COPPER INDUSTRIES 3 (2007), http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/resources/publications/ 
assistance/sectors/miningcompendium.pdf (listing section 402 as one of the “[k]ey 
sections of CWA that may apply to mining and mineral processing facilities”). 
98 33 U.S.C. § 1344; see CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
CONTROVERSIES OVER REDEFINING “FILL MATERIAL” UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 5 
(2009) [hereinafter CRS FILL MATERIAL REPORT] (“The most controversial aspect of the 
final rule was elimination of the waste exclusion previously contained in the Corps’ 
definition of fill material, coupled with the specific inclusion of mining overburden to be 
regulated under Section 404.  In some parts of the country, particularly in Appalachia, 
waste material that results from coal surface mining operations is deposited or discharged 
into waters of the United States as part of the overall mining activity.”). 
99 Seymour, supra note 19, at 823 (stating nearly twenty percent of the EPA’s 
inspections at mining sites from 1990 to 1995 resulted in “enforcement actions for releases 
of pollutants”) (citing U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL HARDROCK MINING 
FRAMEWORK 2 (1997), available at http://www.epa.gov/owm/frame.pdf). 
100 See ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., CRIMES AGAINST NATURE: HOW GEORGE W. BUSH 
AND HIS CORPORATE PALS ARE PLUNDERING THE COUNTRY AND HIJACKING OUR 
DEMOCRACY 35, 39–40, 136–42 (2004) (providing an in-depth look at the Bush II 
administration, its regulatory rollbacks, and evisceration of environmental laws). 
101 See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); see 
generally EARTHJUSTICE ET AL., COURTING DISASTER: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS 
BROKEN THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND WHY CONGRESS MUST FIX IT (2009) [hereinafter 
COURTING DISASTER] (urging Congress to fix these damaging Supreme Court decisions). 
102 See Final Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definitions of “Fill 
Material” and “Discharge of Fill Material”, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129, 31,129–30 (May 9, 2002) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 232) (“Today’s final rule completes the rulemaking process . . . 
jointly proposed to amend [the EPA’s and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’] respective 
regulations so that both agencies would have identical definitions of these key terms.  The 
proposal was intended to clarify the [CWA] Section 404 regulatory framework and 
generally to be consistent with existing regulatory practice.”). 
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permit programs.103  A brief comparison of the two programs 
illustrates the need for a new definition of fill material that maintains 
the separate functions of each program. 
In general, the NPDES and 404 permit programs are 
complementary and are not supposed to overlap.104  The NPDES 
permit program limits the discharge of pollutants and contaminants,105 
while the 404 permits control discharges of normally inert 
materials.106  The 404 permits allow for dredge and fill in waters of 
the United States so long as applicable state or tribal water quality 
standards are not violated.107  Under a power sharing arrangement, the 
Army Corps issues 404 permits and enforces compliance with those 
permits, while the EPA establishes environmental guidelines 
specifying disposal sites for dredged or fill material and levies 
penalties for failing to obtain a 404 permit.108  In addition, the EPA 
has veto power over Army Corps 404 permits, although it is rarely 
exercised.109  States may seek authorization to implement a 404 
 
103 See CRS FILL MATERIAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 8. 
104 Id. at 2; Proposed Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definitions of “Fill 
Material” and “Discharge of Fill Material,” 65 Fed. Reg. 21,292, 21,293 (Apr. 20, 2000) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 232) (“Two different permitting regimes are created by the 
[CWA]: (1) section 404 permits, primarily administered by the Corps, addressing the 
discharge of dredged or fill material, and (2) section 402 permits (commonly referred to as 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, or “NPDES” permits), administered by 
EPA and the States, which address the discharge of all other pollutants.”). 
105 Clean Water Act § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2006) (setting forth a national 
goal that discharge of pollutants into surface waters be eliminated); id. § 1342(a)(1) 
(allowing the EPA to issue NPDES permits “for the discharge of any pollutant, or 
combination of pollutants”). 
106 See Proposed Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definitions of “Fill 
Material” and “Discharge of Fill Material,” 65 Fed. Reg. at 21,293 (“[S]ection 404 focuses 
exclusively on two materials: dredged material and fill material.  The term ‘fill material’ 
clearly contemplates material that fills in a water body, and thereby converts it to dry land 
or changes the bottom elevation.”).  Usually, the fill is inert, nontoxic material, such as 
“rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics, construction debris, wood chips, overburden from mining 
or other excavation activities.”  See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(2) (2009); see also CRS FILL 
MATERIAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 2. 
107 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(b)(1) (2009) (“No discharge of dredged or fill material shall be 
permitted if it: (1) Causes or contributes, after consideration of disposal site dilution and 
dispersion, to violations of any applicable State water quality standard.”); id. § 131.08 
(setting forth the requirements for an Indian tribe to administer a water quality standards 
program). 
108 See CRS FILL MATERIAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 2–3. 
109 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c); Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
606 F. Supp. 2d 121, 138–40 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding the EPA acted arbitrarily and  
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program, but in general the states have not done so, leaving the EPA 
and the Army Corps to implement the program.110  In contrast, forty-
seven states jointly administer the NPDES program with the EPA.111 
The NPDES permit program controls water pollution discharges 
through water quality-based effluent limitations (WQBELs) and 
technology-based effluent limitations (TBELs).112  The WQBELs are 
based on federal guidelines and EPA-approved state or tribal water 
quality standards programs.113  These water quality standards 
programs protect surface water based on designated uses and numeric 
limits that must be no less stringent than the EPA’s national ambient 
water quality criteria.114  The TBELs are numeric limits based on the 
pollution control technologies of dozens of industrial sectors 
including hardrock mining and mineral processing industries.115  
Because mining effluents may be toxic, the TBELs are stringent and 
in some cases entirely prohibit the discharge of pollutants or 
 
capriciously when it failed to veto a 404 permit issued by the Corps for construction of a 
reservoir). 
110 U.S. EPA, State or Tribal Assumption of the Section 404 Permit Program, 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/fact23.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) 
(indicating that only two states currently have authorized 404 programs).  The 404 Permit 
program is almost exclusively implemented by the Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA.  
See id.  Although states and tribes may seek authorization, in general, states or tribes have 
not sought to implement the 404 program.  See Environmental Council of the States, 
Resolution No. 08-3, State Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 Permit Program 
(Apr. 14, 2008), http://www.ecos.org/files/3117_file_Copy_of_Resolution_08_3.pdf 
(asserting that only two states “have sought and assumed the [404] program”). 
111 U.S. EPA, National Pollutant Elimination System (NPDES), State Program Status, 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (indicating that about 
forty-seven states have authorized NPDES Programs).  No tribe has an NPDES permit 
program.  Cf. id.  All states and about fifty-four tribes have authorized water quality 
standards and certification programs.  Id. (discussing state programs); U.S. EPA, Tribes: 
Water Quality Standards & Criteria: Indian Tribal Approvals, http://www.epa.gov/ 
waterscience/tribes/approvtable.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2010) (discussing tribal 
programs). 
112 PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 620–21, 655. 
113 See id. at 662–63. 
114 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313–1314; 40 C.F.R. pt. 131 (2009) (including regulations pertaining 
to water quality standards); 40 C.F.R. pt. 125 (2009) (setting forth “Criteria and Standards 
for Technology-Based Treatment Requirements”). 
115 See 33 U.S.C. § 1316; 40 C.F.R. § 440.100–105 (2009) (including regulations 
concerning copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver, and molybdenum ores).  The CWA regulations 
include dozens of categories for technology-based effluent limitations from every kind of 
point source imaginable, including hospitals, photographic equipment, explosives, ink, 
paint, and landfills.  See 40 C.F.R. pts. 400 to 469 (2009) (listing over fifty categories). 
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contaminants.116  Generally, states issue and enforce NPDES permits.  
As necessary, the EPA may also take enforcement actions against 
violators.117 
In contrast to the NPDES permits, the 404 permits control water 
pollution by following established statutory and regulatory water 
quality guidelines.118  In general, a permittee must obtain a state or 
tribal certification that the permit will meet applicable water quality 
standards.119  In states or Indian country without approved 
certification programs, the EPA issues the certification.120  Water 
quality standard certifications may require a permittee to comply with 
additional specific conditions enforceable under the 404 permit.121 
Arguably, both permit programs provide equivalent protection for 
surface waters because of the water quality standard requirements.  
However, the 2002 rule redefining fill material and the EPA’s 
interpretation of that rule have shaken the carefully constructed 
statutory balance at mining facilities.  The 2002 definition of 
“discharge of fill material” allows “placement of overburden, slurry, 
or tailings or similar mining-related materials” into the waters of the 
United States,122 which significantly impacts the quality of surface 
waters and aquatic life habitats.123 
 
116 E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1) (“[T]here shall be no discharge of process 
wastewater to navigable waters from mills that use the froth-flotation process . . . .”). 
117 33 U.S.C. § 1319. 
118 33 U.S.C. § 1344; 40 C.F.R. § 230 (2009) (setting forth “Guidelines for 
Specification or Disposal Sites for Dredged and Fill Materials”). 
119 However, permittees of state issued 404 permits are not required to obtain a water 
quality standard certification because it is presumed that the state would not issue a 404 
permit in violation of its own standard.  Moreover, few states presently have authorized 
404 permit programs because federal funding to support state 404 programs is limited.  
Environmental Council of the States, supra note 110. 
120 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 121.21 (2009). 
121 40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(4) (“A statement of any conditions which the certifying agency 
deems necessary or desirable with respect to the discharge of the activity . . . .”). 
122 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2009).  Significantly, this definition allows toxic mining waste 
from hardrock mines to be disposed as if it were inert material, effectively legalizing 
mountaintop coal mining and valley fill operations in the Appalachian Mountains.  See 
CRS FILL MATERIAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 6–7.  The debate over mountaintop 
mining and valley fill in coal country is beyond the scope of this paper; however, it is 
mentioned here to display how the changed definition of “fill material” disregards the 
different chemical compositions of coal and hardrock ores.  Id. 
123 For example, hardrock mines generate acid mine drainage and toxic metals that 
poison aquatic life.  See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA OFFICE OF 
COMPLIANCE SECTOR NOTEBOOK PROJECT: PROFILE OF THE METAL MINING INDUSTRY  
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The Army Corps issued a 404 permit under the 2002 definition to 
the Kensington gold mine in Alaska, which allows discharge of 4.5 
million tons of mine tailings into Lower Slate Lake, an amount that 
will kill all aquatic life.124  The crux of the issue is whether the 404 
permit obviated the need for the applicable NPDES permit for 
discharge of a pollutant from a gold mine including stringent 
TBELs.125  The concern is not necessarily the toxicity of these 
tailings,126 but the complete avoidance of applicable TBELs under the 
NPDES regulations.  Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled 
that the 404 permit at Kensington gold mine is legally sufficient to 
usurp the applicable NPDES 402 authority based on the Agency’s 
 
17–21 (1995).  One example of the toxic effects of hazardous mine wastes is the poisoning 
of trumpeter swans due to the presence of zinc and lead at the Tri-State Mining District 
Superfund sites.  W.N. Beyer et al., Zinc and Lead Poisoning in Wild Birds in the Tri-State 
Mining District (Oklahoma, Kansas, and Missouri), 48 ENVTL. CONTAMINATION & 
TOXICOLOGY 1, 111–14 (2004).  Additionally, in southeastern Missouri, crayfish have 
been poisoned and their populations decimated as a result of living downstream from 
active lead mines.  A.L. Allert et al., Ecological Effects of Lead Mining on Ozark Streams: 
In-situ Toxicity to Woodland Crayfish, 72 ECOTOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. SAFETY 1207, 
1208 (2008) (describing the toxic effects of increased metal exposures and reduced 
population densities of crayfish immediately downstream of lead mining sites). 
124 Press Release, Earthjustice, Court Stops Destruction of Alaskan Lake by Mining 
Company (Aug. 24, 2006), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/006/court  
-stops-destruction-of-alaskan-lake-by-mining-company.html.  That mining company was 
in the process of preparing the lake for use as a waste disposal site, where it plans to 
eventually dispose 4.5 million tons of mine waste.  Id.  On August 24, 2006, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals issued a temporary injunction halting the destruction of Lower 
Slate Lake at the site of the proposed Kensington gold mine.  Id.  However, in a recent 
U.S. Supreme Court opinion, six Justices ruled that the 404 permit was legally sufficient 
based on the support of an EPA interagency memorandum.  Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. 
Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2473, 2479 (2009) (J. Breyer, concurring; 
J. Scalia, concurring in part and in the judgment).  The three dissenting Justices stated the 
Court’s interpretation of the regulatory scheme was unsupportable under the clear 
congressional intent of the CWA to protect waters of the United States.  Id. at 2484 
(Ginsburg, J., Stevens, J., Souter, J., dissenting). 
125 40 C.F.R. § 440.102 (2009); see Memorandum from Diane Regas, Dir., Office of 
Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, et al., to Randy Smith, Dir., 
Office of Water, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency  (May 17, 2004).  Compare Supplemental Brief 
for Petitioner Coeur Alaska, Inc. at 2, Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation 
Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458 (2009) (No. 07-984, 07-990) with Supplemental Brief for 
Respondents Se. Alaska Conservation Council at 7, Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska 
Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458 (2009) (No. 07-984, 07-990). 
126 See Supplemental Brief for Petitioner State of Alaska at 20, Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. 
Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458 (2009) (No. 07-984, 07-990).  Alaska 
contends that tailings from Kensington gold mine are similar to the traditional rock and 
soil used as fill material with the same effect on the aquatic environment as those 
materials.  Id. 
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2002 definition of fill material and the subsequent EPA interpretation 
of that rule.127 
The 2002 Agency definition, the EPA’s interpretative memo, and 
the Supreme Court’s June 2009 opinion created a schism in the 
boundary between the NPDES and 404 permit programs.128  A 404 
permit should not be sufficient to allow a discharge that is otherwise 
prohibited under applicable NPDES effluent limit guidelines.  
Regardless of the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Kensington Gold 
Mine case, the 2002 Agency definition of fill material could be 
withdrawn and reevaluated by the Army Corps and the EPA to restore 
balance in the two permit programs.  Environmental degradation 
resulting from the disposal of hardrock mine tailings into surface 
waters is untenable in light of the CWA’s purpose to restore the 
integrity of the waters of the United States.129  If the agency’s action 
is insufficient, then Congress may enact a clarification to the CWA.  
For example, one proposed CWA amendment stated its intention “to 
reverse the revised regulations,” e.g., Clean Water Protection Act, 
H.R. 1310, 111th Cong. (2009), which would have added “a 
definition of ‘fill material’ to the Clean Water Act similar to the 
EPA’s regulatory definition that was in effect before 2002 . . . plus a 
statement that the term does not include ‘any pollutant discharged into 
the water primarily to dispose of waste.’”130 
 
127 See Coeur Alaska, 129 S. Ct. at 2474 (“Here, we now hold, §404 applies, not 
§402.”). 
128 CRS FILL MATERIAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 8–9 (“One analyst [has] observed 
that the result of the [rule change is that] the baseline of what is regulated by the 404 
program [and] the NPDES program [has changed].  Under the Corps’ previous regulation, 
the disposal of waste was solely subject to Section 402.  Now, where the waste has the 
effect of fill, the government believes that regulation under Section 404 is appropriate.  
Thus, fill material now defines the extent of the NPDES program, because only pollutants 
subject to effluent limitations are excluded from regulation as fill.  According to this view, 
the Section 404 permitting program has been expanded at the expense of EPA’s NPDES 
program.”) (citing Nathaniel Browand, Note, Shifting the Boundary Between the Sections 
402 and 404 Permitting Programs by Expanding the Definition of Fill Material, 31 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 617, 645–48 (2003)). 
129 See Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) (setting forth the goal of 
the Act “to restore and maintain chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters”); id. § 1311(a). 
130 CRS FILL MATERIAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 3–4, 8; see also Clean Water 
Protection Act, H.R. 1310, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (amending section 502 of the CWA to 
define “fill material”). 
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The Obama administration need not wait for Congress.  A coherent 
policy on mining waste disposal for coal waste could include 
hardrock mines, too.131  For example, mining overburden, but not 
tailings or slag, could be included in a revised definition of fill 
material provided the source is not subject to TBELs and the material 
passes a toxicity test, such as the RCRA toxicity characteristic test132 
or the Synthetic Precipitation Leaching Procedure test for low toxicity 
wastes described in Part I supra.133  On the other hand, a new 
government policy could forbid mountaintop coal mining and valley 
fill, which would also effectively ban the use of hardrock mining 
overburden and wastes as fill material. 
In the meantime, states and tribes with authorized water quality 
standards certification programs should continue to exercise their 
authority to place specific conditions on 404 permits for disposal of 
hardrock mining wastes in accordance with their state and tribal laws 
and regulations.  The importance of tribal governments establishing 
water quality standards and certification programs to control 404 
permits cannot be understated, especially for purposes of protecting 
waters in Indian country.134 
Other reformers suggest CWA legislative changes that will control 
contamination at hardrock mining sites, for example, “tightening the 
CWA’s standards to include, or more stringently regulate, discharges 
to groundwater and to non-navigable waters could lessen the 
environmental degradation caused by hardrock mining.”135  However 
laudable the suggestion may be, Congress may not be ready to control 
groundwater quality through the CWA.  The CWA is already 
complex, even though it only addresses surface waters, and other 
 
131 Interior Secretary Salazar stated that the Obama administration plans to develop “a 
coherent new policy on mountain removal mining.”  James Bruggers, Mining Rule on 
Waste Rock to be Challenged in Court: Salazar Decries Edict on Stream Buffer Zone, 
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Apr. 28, 2009 (quoting Interior Department 
spokesman Frank Quimby). 
132 40 C.F.R. § 261.24 (2009). 
133 40 C.F.R. § 278.3 (2009); Mining Waste Exclusion, 54 Fed. Reg. 36,592, 36,597 
(Sept. 1, 1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261) (discussing low hazard criterion based on 
EPA Method 1312—Synthetic Precipitation Leaching Procedure). 
134 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.  Only a few tribes have EPA-approved 
water quality standards and certification programs.  Id.  Using powers under section 401 of 
the CWA is proactive and may be more effective influence over the 404 permit program 
compared to challenging the Corps after the fact.  Cf. Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 606 F. Supp. 2d 121, 138–40 (D.D.C. 2009). 
135 Lounsbury, supra note 57, at 207. 
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statutes are available, for example RCRA and CERCLA, that regulate 
groundwater and runoff.  For additional discussion of these statutes, 
see discussion supra Part I and infra Part III. 
B.  Clarify CWA Stormwater Rules and Permits for Mining Sites 
An important component of the NPDES program is the regulation 
of stormwater runoff that results from industrial activities that involve 
both active and inactive hardrock mining.136  The federal minimum 
requirements and other details of this stormwater program are 
described in the CWA’s implementing regulations and the EPA-
issued NPDES Stormwater Multi-Sector General Permit (MSGP) for 
Industrial Activities (for use in states and tribes without NPDES 
stormwater programs).137  State and tribal governments are required to 
control stormwater runoff from industrial activities as part of their 
EPA-authorized NPDES stormwater programs.138 
The MSGP only calls for visual inspections once per year, which 
can be waived, and unlike other sectors, there is no requirement that a 
permit holder certify “no industrial materials or activities [were] 
exposed to stormwater.”139  The EPA should be more protective of the 
environment and revise the MSGP at its next reissuance to require 
that stormwater discharges at inactive mining sites be subject to such 
management practices. 
In addition, when the EPA establishes a new RCRA hardrock 
mining and mineral processing special waste management program, 
see discussion supra Part I, then the MSGP should incorporate a 
 
136 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(iii) (2009).  Stormwater discharges associated with 
industrial activities include active and inactive mining operations, as well as non-coal mine 
activities until reclamation is completed under other applicable federal and state laws.  Id. 
137 See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MULTI-SECTOR GENERAL PERMIT 
(MSGP) FOR STORMWATER DISCHARGES ASSOCIATED WITH INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY, 
subpt. 8 (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/msgp2008_finalpermit.pdf 
(setting forth the sector-specific requirements for those seeking an EPA multi-sector 
general permit).  Note that to date, no tribal government has an EPA-approved NPDES 
program.  See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
138 40 C.F.R. § 123.25(a)(9) (2009) (requiring state programs to implement and 
administer stormwater discharge permitting requirements); see generally U.S. EPA, 
Authorization Status for EPA’s Stormwater Construction and Industrial Programs, 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/authorizationstatus.cfm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
139 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MULTI-SECTOR GENERAL PERMIT (MSGP) FOR 
STORMWATER DISCHARGES ASSOCIATED WITH INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITY: FACT SHEET 128 
(2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/msgp2008_finalfs.pdf. 
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reference to this new program just as the 2008 general permit 
incorporates state and federal mining reclamation definitions and 
standards.140  Finally, where states fail to regulate and enforce 
stormwater discharge controls at inactive mining operations, the EPA 
should reduce the CWA’s grant funding until these states establish 
such controls. 
C.  Redefine Waters of the United States 
The government’s CWA permit writers, who write both NPDES 
and 404 permits, are overwhelmed with lengthy and costly procedures 
devoted to the simple purpose of evaluating whether or not water 
bodies, such as streams, creeks, western arroyos, and wetlands are 
waters of the United States subject to regulation under the CWA.141  
The U.S. Supreme Court generated a great deal of confusion about the 
regulatory definition of the CWA term, “waters of the United States,” 
as a result of its SWANCC142 and Rapanos decisions.143  Clarifying 
this term would simplify CWA jurisdiction over wetlands and other 
surface waters, which would consequently improve oversight of 
mining waste discharges.144  This clarification would allow the permit 
writers to focus on controlling discharges rather than having endless 
debates about whether a particular water body is covered by the 
 
140 Id. at 129 (“Changes from Proposed Permit: Commenters raised concerns regarding 
the proposed language that required continued coverage, despite the fact that the site had 
been released from applicable reclamation requirements, for sites that have the potential to 
cause or contribute to exceedances of applicable water quality standards.  EPA agreed that 
this language was inconsistent with 40 CFR 122.26(b)(14)(iii), and deleted it in the final 
permit.”); see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(iii). 
141 Editorial, A Clear, Clean Water Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at A28 (“An 
internal [EPA] report furnished to Congress last year revealed that the agency had dropped 
or delayed more than 400 cases involving suspected violations of the [CWA]—nearly half 
the agency’s entire docket.”); COURTING DISASTER, supra note 101, at 4. 
142 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 
531 U.S. 159, 161 (2001) (ruling that certain isolated intrastate ponds were not protected 
by the CWA although the water bodies were used as migratory bird habitat). 
143 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739, 742 (2006) (holding in a plurality 
opinion that the CWA protects “only those relatively permanent, standing or continuously 
flowing bodies of water” and “only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to 
bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own right”).  In that opinion, Justice 
Kennedy concurred in the judgment but asserted that the proper test was “whether the 
specific wetlands at issue possess[ed] a significant nexus” to traditional navigable waters.  
Id. at 787; see also COURTING DISASTER, supra note 101, at 3. 
144 See, e.g., COURTING DISASTER, supra note 101, at 3, 34–35 (referencing United 
States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009), which took seventeen years to resolve due 
to uncertainty over CWA wetlands jurisprudence). 
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CWA.  For example, many have suggested removing the term 
“navigable” from the statute to eliminate any argument that this term 
restricts federal CWA authority to “navigable-in-fact” water bodies.145 
D.  Summary of Recommended CWA Reform: Legislation and 
Regulation 
The most urgent action needed to improve CWA protections 
against hardrock mining waste pollution is to withdraw the 2002 rule 
defining discharge of fill material into surface water, which has 
corrupted the CWA by including overburden and mining wastes in 
that definition.146  Although the Supreme Court upheld application of 
this definition in the controversial Kensington Gold Mine case, giving 
deference to the expert administrative agency that promulgated and 
interpreted its own rule,147 the best thing the government could do is 
withdraw the 2002 rule and forbid the disposal of hardrock 
overburden and mining waste as fill material under the 404 permit 
program.  This would protect integrity of the water and restore 
balance between the 404 and NPDES permit programs.  The EPA 
should also institute a test that screens nontoxic versus toxic wastes 
and allows the use of only relatively nontoxic, inert, hardrock wastes 
as fill material under 404 permits.  In addition, the next MSGP should 
include best management practice requirements for inactive hardrock 
mining facilities.  Finally, Congress should clarify the meaning of 
“waters of the United States” as used in the CWA.  These CWA 
reforms would improve surface water protections at active and 
inactive hardrock mining and mineral processing facilities. 
 
145 See Clean Water Restoration Act, S. 787, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009) (amending the 
CWA to clarify federal jurisdiction); see also Editorial, supra note 141, at A28; COURTING 
DISASTER, supra note 101, at ES-4, ES-40. 
146 Final Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definitions of “Fill Material” 
and “Discharge of Fill Material,” 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129 (May 9, 2002) (codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 232); see supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
147 Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2468, 2474 
(2009). 
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III 
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, 
AND LIABILITIES ACT (CERCLA) REFORM: LEGISLATIVE 
RENEWAL OF THE SUPERFUND TRUST FUND 
The Superfund Trust Fund (or CERCLA) is one of the most 
powerful regulatory programs in existence for cleanup of abandoned 
mine lands (AMLs).148  The Superfund is used to conduct 
environmental response actions at abandoned and inactive hazardous 
waste sites in order to comprehensively protect and preserve public 
health and the environment from the effects of releases or threatened 
releases of hazardous substances to the environment.149  Although 
CERCLA works well, legislative amendments are necessary to reform 
this statute’s funding mechanism and expedite the cleanup process at 
AMLs.  Congress should amend CERCLA to renew the Superfund 
tax on oil and chemical industries and expand the Act’s reach to 
include the hardrock mining and mineral processing industry to allow 
federal land managers to use Superfund monies for limited response 
costs at AMLs. 
A.  Renew and Expand the Superfund Tax 
Congress created the Hazardous Substances Superfund Trust Fund 
by instituting a Superfund tax, a special tax assessment where the 
largest share falls on oil and chemical industries and the smallest 
share is on business corporations.150  This tax codifies the polluter 
pays principle by spreading the cost of abandoned hazardous waste 
 
148 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA) §§ 101–405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).  CERCLA has been identified 
by U.S. Forest Service experts as one of the most important laws governing the cleanup of 
AMLs.  Michael N. Greeley, Program Manager, U.S. Forest Service, Reclamation of 
Abandoned Mine Land, Presentation before the Society of Mining, Metallurgy, and 
Exploration (Mar. 1999), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/geology/amlpaper.htm 
[hereinafter Greeley Presentation]; see generally U.S. EPA, Abandoned Mine Lands, 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/aml/ (providing information on abandoned mine 
lands and site locations, as well as links for policy guidance and technical resources) (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
149 H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 
6119–20. 
150 Taxes were initially assessed under section 511, but the taxing authority has expired.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 9653; see also infra discussion Part III.C; JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR ET AL., 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SUPERFUND TAXES OR GENERAL REVENUES: FUTURE FUNDING 
ISSUES FOR THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM 3 (2008) [hereinafter CRS REPORT, SUPERFUND 
TAXES OR GENERAL REVENUES]. 
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site cleanup among the responsible industries.151  However, the oil 
and chemical industries complain that the tax is unfair because the 
mining and mineral processing industry pay only the smaller business 
corporation share even though Superfund spends billions on AMLs.152  
The oil and chemical companies are correct that the Superfund spent 
at least twenty-two billion dollars from 1998 to 2007, cleaning up 
abandoned hardrock mines.153  The mining industry should pay a fair 
share of the Superfund tax. 
In 1995, the U.S. government allowed the Superfund tax provisions 
to expire,154 and by 2004 the Superfund Trust Fund had been 
completely depleted.155  Consequently, the government’s premier 
cleanup program for abandoned hazardous waste sites is now 
supported by general tax revenues.156  The program is starved for 
funds and cleanup actions are stalled.157  For example, the Stimulus 
Act of 2009158 provided $600 million for shovel-ready Superfund 
cleanup projects where risks to human health and the environment 
have been exacerbated by sites that had not yet been cleaned up due 
to lack of funds.159  At least $50 million of these funds were allocated 
to AMLs or mineral processing facilities in EPA Region 7.160  Instead 
 
151 See generally RENA STEINZOR & MARGARET CLUNE, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 
THE TOLL OF SUPERFUND NEGLECT: TOXIC WASTE DUMPS & COMMUNITIES AT RISK 17 
(2006) [hereinafter SUPERFUND NEGLECT] (describing the deterioration of the widely 
known “polluter pays” principle and the consequent threat to public health); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 9607. 
152 Seymour, supra note 19, at 942, 942 n.797.  Oil and chemical industries have 
complained that mining and mineral processing industries should be included to make the 
Superfund tax fair.  Id. at 943. 
153 SENATE HEARING ON HARDROCK MINING, supra note 70, at 4.  While the EPA 
spent $22 billion, the BLM and Forest Service spent a total of $259 million.  Id. at 4–5. 
154 CRS REPORT, SUPERFUND TAXES OR GENERAL REVENUES, supra note 150, at 3. 
155 Id. at 4–5. 
156 Id. 
157 SUPERFUND NEGLECT, supra note 151, at 7. 
158 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115 (2009) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1). 
159 SUPERFUND NEGLECT, supra note 151, at 7, 17–18; see also John M. Broder, 
Without Superfund Tax, Stimulus Aids Cleanups, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, at A16 
(reporting the EPA Administrator Jackson stated that “‘[u]nder the Recovery Act, we’re 
getting harmful pollutants and dangerous chemicals out of these communities and putting 
jobs and investment back in.’”).  This article also stated that stimulus monies would 
“accelerate progress at 50 Superfund sites in 28 states.”  Id. 
160 Nancy Gaarder, Stimulus Funds to Speed Omaha Lead Cleanup, OMAHA WORLD 
HERALD, Apr. 15, 2009, http://www.olscag.com/en/resourcesGeneral/StimulusFunds.pdf  
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of relying on fluctuating emergency funding and general revenues, 
renewal of the Superfund tax would ensure that the Superfund Trust 
Fund is available for such cleanups.  Moreover, given the purpose of 
CERCLA, as a comprehensive response, cleanup, and liability 
scheme, it is fair to reinstate the Superfund tax and expand its reach to 
the mining and mineral processing industry.  The reinstitution and 
expansion of this tax would ensure that cleanup costs are borne by 
those industries responsible for the toxic wastes at AMLs and mineral 
processing facilities. 
B.  Federal Land Managers’ Access to the Superfund Trust Fund 
CERCLA mandates that federal land management (FLM) agencies 
conduct investigations and cleanup at abandoned hazardous waste 
sites on public lands where the federal government is a liable party.161  
The U.S. government is therefore responsible, in certain situations, 
for serious environmental and public health threats presented at 
hardrock mining sites.162  Cleanup of AMLs on public lands is funded 
by appropriations to FLM agencies, by private parties (such as former 
mine operators) when viable potentially responsible parties (PRPs) 
are identified, or by both.163  In some cases, no such parties are 
identified and the FLM funds the entire cleanup of the orphan sites.164  
In general, Superfund Trust Fund monies are not available for the 
cleanup of AMLs on public lands.165 
 
(describing how $25 million will be allocated to speed cleanup of lead-contaminated yards 
in Omaha, Nebraska, from a lead smelter facility).  Wally Kennedy, Stimulus Funding to 
Provide Millions for Mining Cleanup, JOPLIN GLOBE, Apr. 15, 2009, http://www.joplin 
globe.com/neo_sek/local_story_105213609.html?keyword=secondarystory (describing 
how $45–$75 million in stimulus funding will be directed to the cleanup of contaminated 
mining sites in two counties in Missouri, as well as Cherokee County, Kansas, and Ottawa 
County, Oklahoma). 
161 See, e.g., §§ 107, 120, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9620 (2006) (imposing liability on 
current owner(s)/operator(s), former owner(s)/operator(s), and arrangers); United States v. 
Newmont USA Ltd., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1076 (E.D. Wash. 2007) (finding the U.S. 
government liable for its share for the cleanup of Midnite Mine, an uranium mine on an 
Indian reservation).  For an in-depth review of the FLM agencies’ CERCLA liability at 
AMLs, see Seymour, supra note 19, at 857–933. 
162 See Seymour, supra note 19, at 807. 
163 Id. at 805–06. 
164 Id. at 864 (explaining that for orphan sites, federal land managers do not have access 
to the Superfund Trust Fund to offset cleanup costs).  CERCLA provides that “no money 
in the Fund shall be available to pay for remedial action . . . with respect to federally 
owned facilities.”  42 U.S.C. § 9611(e)(3). 
165 See Seymour, supra note 19, at 864. 
 2010] Developing a Sustainable Hardrock Mining and  159 
Mineral Processing Industry 
The FLM agencies need access to the Superfund Trust Fund 
monies to investigate and cleanup AMLs because agency budgets for 
this purpose are embarrassingly small.166  Also, most CERCLA 
liability for AMLs is based on these agencies’ land ownership rather 
than on operations or arranger liability.167  Federally funded cleanup 
of AMLs is only a small part of the massive DOI and Forest Service 
responsibilities, which include areas where these agencies have more 
expertise, such as “road, bridge and trail maintenance . . . watershed 
restoration and ecosystem enhancement projects; facilities 
improvement, maintenance and renovation . . . .”168  Increasing the 
annual budgets of FLM agencies or providing more stimulus funding 
could expedite the cleanup of AMLs, but relying on general tax 
revenues simply fails to realize one of Superfund’s fundamental 
goals: the polluter pays. 
Paying for the investigation of AMLs and orphan site cleanups 
with Superfund Trust Fund monies that are generated through a 
renewed tax that includes taxation of the hardrock mining and mineral 
processing would shift the financial burden to the mining industry, 
where it belongs.  The Superfund tax and CERCLA liability for 
miners and mineral processing operators is “a fair—although long 
delayed and not entirely expected—recompense for generations of 
free and open access to the public lands.”169  Also, it is easier for 
Congress to amend CERCLA, reinstate the Superfund tax, and 
provide the FLM agencies access to Superfund monies than to enact a 
whole new tax and create a new mine reclamation trust fund system 
as some have suggested.170  In the end, both methods would achieve 
the same polluter pays purpose, save general revenues for other 
projects, and use an industry-donor/government-beneficiary trust fund 
for the cleanup of AMLs. 
FLM agencies could use Superfund monies to identify other viable 
PRPs at AMLs on public lands.  Searches for PRPs are expensive 
because mining land ownership and mineral titles can be complex.171  
 
166 See Scott Fields, The Earth’s Open Wounds: Abandoned and Orphaned Mines, 111 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A-154, A-161 (2003). 
167 See Seymour, supra note 19, at 805–06, 866. 
168 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115 (2009) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1). 
169 See Seymour, supra note 19, at 935–36. 
170 Id. at 933. 
171 Id. at 864, 951. 
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When PRP searches are conducted early in the process and another 
viable PRP is identified, cleanup is faster because the FLM agency 
and private parties share the cleanup responsibilities.172  When PRP 
searches are delayed and no other viable PRPs are found, the site is 
deemed an orphan site and the cleanup process slows down.173  The 
FLM agency has to seek congressional appropriations for the cleanup 
of AMLs, which competes with that agency’s primary mission and 
budget priorities.  Giving the FLM agency access to Superfund Trust 
Fund monies removes this bureaucratic hurdle, allows faster 
identification of orphan AMLs, and speeds up the FML agency 
response. 
Allowing FLM agencies to access the Superfund Trust Fund for 
these limited purposes would not mean allowing wholesale use of 
Superfund monies for the FLM agency.  This proposed exception is 
for AMLs only and would not excuse the FLM agencies from liability 
at federal facilities.  The exception would simply provide access to 
funds that would speed cleanup of AMLs.  Furthermore, if the tax is 
renewed, the polluters would be providing the funding, not the 
taxpayers. 
In summary, a carefully drafted amendment to section 111(c) of 
CERCLA, “Uses of the Fund,”174 could authorize use of Superfund 
Trust Fund monies for PRP searches at AMLs on public lands and for 
cleanup of orphan sites.  This amendment would realize fundamental 
CERCLA goals, including the polluter pays principle, and expedite 
response actions to protect human health and the environment. 
 
172 Id. at 865. 
173 Greeley Presentation, supra note 148 (“The inherent complexity of mineral and 
surface title presents one of the most difficult institutional barriers to AML reclamation.  
Identification of potentially responsible parties (PRPs) at abandoned mine sites is 
laborious and expensive.  When found, the responsible party or current owner may not be 
financially capable of funding the cleanup.  Ultimately, the party held responsible may be 
the state or federal government. . . . A major impediment to the use of CERCLA, however, 
is the requirement that before cleanup occurs, a search for PRPs must be conducted and, if 
found, the responsible party must conduct the reclamation or pay for it.  The PRP 
procedure is costly, time consuming, and often non-productive.  Some states and private 
interests have shown extreme reluctance to participate in the Interdepartmental AML 
Watershed Cleanup program if CERCLA is involved.”). 
174 42 U.S.C. § 9611(c) (2006). 
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C.  Advantages of Superfund Tax Renewal and FLM Access to the 
Superfund Trust Fund 
Legislative reinstatement and expansion of the Superfund tax 
offers many advantages,175 including prioritizing cleanups and 
conducting inventories at AMLs.  Legislative action would also 
promote good governance by initiating an integral approach.  Finally, 
a solvent Superfund would speed response actions in general.176 
1.  Inventory and Prioritization 
The EPA’s Hardrock Mining Framework provides a partial 
inventory of AMLs using the CERCLA Information System 
(CERCLIS).177  States use many different methods to identify 
abandoned mines, which confuses site inventories and 
prioritization.178  Nevertheless, determining the exact number of 
AMLs in the United States and the exact prioritization for cleanup is 
not as important as getting started on the sites already identified and 
evaluated.179  Thus, a separate federal inventory just for AMLs is 
unnecessary and duplicative given existing CERCLIS methodology. 
 
175 SUPERFUND NEGLECT, supra note 151, at 17–18 (“First, [Superfund] created a 
liability scheme to get [PRPs] to pay for the cleanup of contaminated sites themselves . . . . 
[Uncooperative PRPs] were subject to ‘treble damages’ — three times ultimate cleanup 
costs — as punishment for their recalcitrance.  Second, the statute created a multi-billion 
dollar trust fund . . . that the federal government could use to pay for site cleanups where 
responsible parties ‘could not, or would not, foot the bill.’  The law further provided that 
the government could recover those costs from [PRPs], leading to the colloquial label 
‘shovels first, lawyers later.’  To finance the Trust Fund, Congress levied taxes on those 
industrial sectors most likely to have contributed to the hazardous wastes sites.”). 
176 See id. at 12–13; Seymour, supra note 19, at 936 (“A more fundamental problem 
[compared to the inventory problem] with hardrock mining cleanups, of course, is that 
sources of funding for mine cleanups are limited.”); Senate Oversight Hearing, supra note 
31, at 64 (statement of Velma M. Smith, Senior Policy Associate, National Environmental 
Trust) (stating that the single most compelling impediment to cleanup of AML “is not 
regulatory but financial”). 
177 U.S. EPA, Superfund Site Information, http://epa.gov/superfund/sites/cursites/ 
index.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL HARDROCK 
MINING FRAMEWORK, supra note 99, at appx. F (“Priority Setting Options”). 
178 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL HARDROCK MINING FRAMEWORK, supra 
note 99, at appx. F-11, F-17; see also Seymour, supra note 19, at 936 (proposing that an 
accurate inventory and prioritizing method is necessary). 
179 Fields, supra note 166, at A-156 (“In practical terms, says U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) biologist and geologist Carol Russell, whether there are 100,000 
or 500,000 abandoned mines may not matter much.  ‘There are so many that we don’t 
need to go inventory them,’ she says.  ‘We don’t have enough money to deal with the ones 
we’ve found already.’”).  Experts agree that (1) the number of AML sites is unknown and  
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The most serious AMLs are already prioritized for cleanup under 
the Superfund National Priorities List and the Hazardous Ranking 
System.180  At least, sixty-five nonfederal facility mining or mineral 
processing sites are listed on the National Priorities List.181  On April 
8, 2009, the EPA added three additional mining or mineral processing 
sites to that list.182  Incidentally, none of the new added sites are 
located in Western states, and only one site of the thirteen proposed 
new sites is in a Western state.183  The listing process ranks AMLs 
relative to other abandoned waste sites in the United States.184  For 
federal public lands, the Superfund Federal Facilities Docket lists 
AMLs relative to other federal facilities on the docket.185  A separate 
prioritization scheme for AMLs on public lands is unnecessary and 
usurps EPA authority. 
2.  An Integral Approach 
CERCLA establishes an integral approach to the cleanup of AMLs 
where the EPA is ultimately in charge of environmental protection 
and is authorized to oversee the FLM cleanup actions.186  The EPA 
 
risk assessments are case-by-case, (2) the unintended damage is increasing, and (3) the 
funds are not available for even the largest and most harmful AML sites.  Id. at A-160 to 
A-161. 
180 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA) § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (2006). 
181 See U.S. EPA, Abandoned Mine Lands, NPL Sites, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/ 
programs/aml/amlsite/npl.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).  One half of these national 
priority list sites were active mines in the past ten to fifteen years.  Id. 
182 See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Adds Nine Hazardous Waste 
Sites to Superfund’s National Priorities List / EPA Also Proposes to Add an Additional 13 
New Sites to the NPL (Apr. 8, 2009) (listing three mining and mineral processing sites:  
U.S. Smelter Lead Refinery Site, East Chicago, Indiana; Ore Knob Mine Site, Ashe 
County, North Carolina; and Raritan Bay Slag, Sayerville, New Jersey). 
183 Cf. id.; Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Proposes Adding Flat Creek 
Iron Mountain Mine and Mill to List of Superfund Sites (Apr. 8, 2009).  For example, an 
abandoned mine in South Carolina under consideration is the Barite Hill Site, a former 
gold and silver mine, operated from 1989 to 1994 that went bankrupt in 1999, leaving 
135.5 acres of contamination and insufficient financial assurances for cleanup.  See U.S. 
EPA, Barite Hill / Nevada Goldfields, McCormick, South Carolina, http://epa.gov/ 
superfund/sites/npl/nar1784.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
184 See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (establishing the NPL and prioritizing sites by a hazard 
ranking system). 
185 See 42 U.S.C. § 9620(c) (establishing the federal agency hazardous waste 
compliance docket); id. § 9620(d) (setting forth “assessment and evaluation” and ranking 
federal facilities using the same criteria as non-federal facilities). 
186 See id. § 9620. 
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and FLM agencies have established joint policies to protect the 
environment and manage mineral development.187  Moreover, 
CERCLA guidance coordinates the cleanup of AMLs at federal 
facilities where private parties and FLM agencies share liability as a 
result of situations including mixed ownership or shared 
repositories.188  Moreover, the EPA’s new 2008 mine site cleanup 
guidance provides FLM agencies and private parties with expert 
technical resources for standardizing CERCLA cleanup protocols.189 
3.  Compliance with Other Laws and Good Governance 
John Seymour, an attorney at the DOI, has noted that “CERCLA’s 
breadth is particularly important at mining sites, where contamination 
commonly extends to soils, sediments, groundwater, surface water, 
and air.”190  The Superfund addresses these multimedia contamination 
problems by requiring that cleanup actions comply with applicable or 
relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARs) mandated by other 
environmental laws such as the CWA and RCRA.  Therefore, a new 
 
187 INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT AMONG THE EPA, BLM AND NATIONAL PARK 
SERVICE AND US FOREST SERVICE (1995) (establishing policies to manage the Nation’s 
mineral resources in an environmentally-sound manner). 
188 Memorandum from the Federal Facilities Enforcement Office, U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency to its Regional Docket Coordinators (June 24, 2003) (setting forth EPA “Policy on 
Listing Mixed Ownership Mine or Mill Sites Created as a Result of the General Mining 
Law of 1872 on the Federal Agency Hazardous Waste Compliance Docket”); see also 
Memorandum from Office of Solid Waste & Emergency Response, U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency to Regional Administrators (Apr. 26, 2005) (communicating “Policy on Joint 
Repositories at Mixed-Ownership Hardrock Mine Sites”).  The EPA and FLM agencies 
utilize CERCLIS/NPL/HRS process and not the Federal Facilities Docket for AML sites 
that have mixed private and federal ownership due to operation of the General Mining 
Law of 1872. 
189 ABANDONED MINE LANDS TEAM, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ABANDONED MINE 
SITE CHARACTERIZATION AND CLEANUP HANDBOOK 10-1 to 10-13 (2008).  It is not true 
that cleanup of hardrock mining sites is in its infancy, as Mr. Seymour suggested six years 
ago.  See Seymour, supra note 19, at 819.  The truth is that the EPA and FLM agencies 
have ample experience in remediation technology and are coordinating their responses. 
190 Seymour, supra note 19, at 802.  For example, at the Madison County Mines Site in 
Missouri, the “[s]urface water sampling revealed concentrations of arsenic, cadmium, 
copper, chromium, lead, mercury, nickel, and zinc above Ambient Water Quality Criteria 
(AWQC).  Specifically, lead was detected in surface water up to 12 micrograms per liter 
(ug/L) and sediment up to 11,000 mg/kg.  Soil sampling in residential yards revealed lead 
at concentrations as high as 10,000 mg/kg.  Air sampling revealed filter concentrations of 
arsenic, cobalt, copper, lead, and nickel at greater than three times background 
concentrations.”  U.S. EPA, NPL Site Narrative for Madison County Mines, 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/nar1679.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
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RCRA special waste program, like the one suggested above, would 
provide ARARs for cleanup of AMLs on private property and public 
lands, bringing national consistency to CERCLA cleanups.  In fact, 
CERCLA policy and guidance documents anticipate that the EPA will 
promulgate a new special waste management program under RCRA 
at some time in the future.191  Until then, the CERCLA guidance 
recommends that only RCRA solid waste regulations be considered 
ARARs. 
Furthermore, CERCLA and its implementing regulations, the 
National Contingency Plan,192 together have ample administrative 
procedures that provide the hallmarks of good governance, sound 
science, accountability, transparency, and consistency for cleanup of 
AMLs. 
D.  Reforms Beyond Superfund 
Some scholars suggest that the Superfund program functions well 
without the Superfund tax and that AMLs are best addressed by 
changing federal natural resource laws.193  Stories that the EPA has 
enough money or that the Superfund taxes are onerous are nothing 
more than myths with a slim relationship to history or reality.194  
Furthermore, for decades, Congress has failed to address needed 
mining law reform.195 
Some reformers urge the EPA to promulgate new financial 
assurance regulations to protect human health and the environment 
using authority granted by CERCLA.196  Recently, the EPA 
announced its intention to develop financial assurance regulations for 
 
191 National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan, 59 Fed. Reg. 
47,384 (Sept. 15, 1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, CERCLA COMPLIANCE WITH OTHER LAWS MANUAL: PART II. CLEAN AIR ACT 
AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES AND STATE REQUIREMENTS 6-4 (1989) (“When 
promulgated, the revised [RCRA] regulations may be ARARs . . . .”). 
192 See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2009). 
193 Seymour, supra note 19, at 944.  Mr. Seymour suggests that CERCLA is not a 
preferred approach because Superfund is not available for public land cleanups.  Id.  The 
reform suggested herein solves this problem. 
194 SUPERFUND NEGLECT, supra note 151, at 3. 
195 Dale Bumpers, Capitol Hill's Longest-Running Outrage, Congress Winks While the 
Mining Companies Shaft the Taxpayers, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1998, at 14. 
196 U.S. EPA, EPA Resists GAO Calls for Urgent Reforms on Financing Cleanups, 
INSIDE EPA, Aug. 30, 2005 (on file with author).  Section 108(b) of CERCLA may be 
used to require financial assurance at Superfund sites, but the EPA has not taken action.  
Such regulations would impact all Superfund sites. 
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the hardrock mining industry pursuant to section 108 of CERCLA; 
the rule will be proposed in 2011.197  However, as described in Part I, 
supra, it is easier to promulgate new RCRA regulations to provide 
financial assurance requirements at hardrock mining and mineral 
processing facilities. 
E.  Summary of Superfund Legislative Renewal 
The Superfund Program involves an integral approach to 
environmental regulation of AMLs based on the polluter pays 
principle.198  The Superfund tax is essential to this scheme.  
Reinstating and expanding the tax to include the mining and mineral 
processing industry promotes sustainable development while also 
encouraging the mining industry to take responsibility for AMLs.  In 
addition, allowing limited use of Superfund monies for abandoned 
mines on public lands could expedite cleanup.  An entirely new trust 
fund for AMLs is unnecessary, duplicative, usurps EPA authority, 
adds turmoil to federal agency responsibilities, and conflates federal 
natural resource law with environmental law. 
IV 
SUSTAINABLE MINING PRESERVES AND PROTECTS PUBLIC GOODS 
[W]e can’t have mines everywhere, and we shouldn’t have mines 
that threaten our national treasures. 
~ Bill Clinton199 
If we aren’t willing to pay a price for our values, then we should 
ask ourselves whether we truly believe in them at all. 
~ Barack Obama200 
 
197 Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Publishes Notice Identifying 
Hardrock Mining Industry for Financial Responsibility Requirements / EPA Plans to 
Propose Rule by Spring 2011 (July 13, 2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/ 
admpress.nsf/a883dc3da7094f97852572a00065d7d8/90a65f473216e941852575f2004807e
b!OpenDocument. 
198 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA) § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006). 
199 Alison Mitchell, President Designates a Monument Across Utah, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
19, 1996, at B11. 
200 Quotes of Barack Obama, http://www.barackobama.net/barack-obama-quotes.html 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
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A.  Reforms to Preserve National Landscapes 
Hardrock mining and mineral processing locations must be limited 
to preserve our national treasures.  The preservation and protection of 
these locations reflect modern social values; people appreciate natural 
beauty and ecosystem services and are willing to pay for their 
preservation.  An essential component of the proposed Hardrock 
Mining Reclamation Act of 2009 (HMRA)201 is the protection of 
national landscapes from environmental harm due to mineral 
activities.202  These protected places would include wilderness areas, 
locations of critical environmental concern, national conservation 
system units, wild and scenic rivers, and U.S. Forest Service roadless 
areas.203  Sacred sites on federal lands should also be considered 
protected places.  An Executive Order issued by President Clinton 
provides, inter alia, that federal action shall avoid affecting the 
integrity of sacred tribal lands.204  Although the proposed HMRA 
does not explicitly list sacred sites, it does allow tribal governments to 
petition the federal government to review and withdraw sacred sites 
from consideration as a location for mineral activities.205  One small 
hurdle in the proposed HMRA is that a withdrawal is “subject to valid 
existing rights,”206 which means property rights are protected in 
existing mining claims.  Thus, the modern valuation of these special 
 
201 Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2009, S. 796, 111th Cong. § 307 (2009) 
(amending the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e) 
(2006) to provide for the preservation of special places). 
202 Id. 
203 Id.; see also, David O. Williams, Salazar Flooded with Support for Ban on Grand 
Canyon Uranium Mining, COLO. INDEP., Nov. 6, 2009, http://coloradoindependent.com/ 
41656/salazar-flooded-with-support-for-ban-on-grand-canyon-uranium-mining (describing 
temporary ban on mining). 
204 See Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996); see also Scott 
Sandlin, Group Challenges Mt. Taylor Listing, ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov, 19, 2009 
(describing a court challenge to the state’s listing of seven hundred square miles of the 
Mount Taylor area on the New Mexico Register of Cultural Places).  The Laguna and 
other pueblos nominated the area for listing under criteria showing significance from time 
immemorial to the present.  Id. 
205 S. 796, § 307 (proposing to allow states, tribes, and local governments to petition 
federal land management agencies for such withdrawals); see also Navajo Nation v. U.S. 
Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (rejecting Native American 
tribe’s claim that use of treated sewage effluent for snow making on San Francisco Peaks, 
a sacred site located on federal lands that was used as a ski resort, violated the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act). 
206 S. 796, § 307(5)(A), (B). 
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places includes the cost of government compensation to the mineral 
rights owners. 
Preserving special places as “islands within the river of growth” 
may be more inconvenient or expensive than mining minerals 
elsewhere.207  However, if the dominant culture truly values 
preservation, we must be willing to pay added costs for mineral 
products collected in harmony with these modern social values. 
The proposed HMRA requires FLM agencies to review withdrawal 
submissions from states and tribes, but does not articulate a standard 
for evaluating the economic costs of withdrawal compared to the 
environmental and social costs of not withdrawing certain treasured 
national landscapes.208  The natural capital approach is a new 
combined economic and ecological theory for evaluating the 
sustainability of mineral activities and could be useful to FLM 
agencies as a standard to consider in conducting reviews.  The natural 
capital approach is especially useful as a “bridging concept between 
effective environmental management and sustainable development” in 
places where this industry is allowed to proceed or not.209 
The natural capital approach identifies and quantifies the natural 
environment and associated ecosystem services210 and characterizes 
hardrock mining and mineral processing operations as “[p]rovisioning 
services.”211  Theoretically, the natural capital approach leads to better 
decision making for managing, preserving, and restoring natural 
environments.212  This approach also understands and manages the 
biophysical and socioeconomic interactions with ecosystems; local 
environments are “viewed as a functioning whole where all living and 
non-living entities are interconnected and in constant interaction.”213  
While quantification issues are apparent in the natural capital 
approach, the modern economist faced with an issue of ore valuation 
needs a system to evaluate ecosystem services.  When considering 
 
207 Ragsdale, supra note 2, at 915 n.48 (citing CHARLES WILKINSON, THE EAGLE 
BIRD: MAPPING A NEW WEST 41 (revised ed., Johnson Books 1992) (1999)). 
208 S. 796, § 307 (amending the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 to 
provide for the preservation of special places). 
209 VIVEK ANAND VOORA & HENRY DAVID VENEMA, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEV., THE NATURAL CAPITAL APPROACH: A CONCEPT PAPER 12 (2008). 
210 Id. at 4. 
211 Id. at 11. 
212 Id. at 12. 
213 Id. at 15. 
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withdrawal of a special place from mineral activities the ecosystem 
services may be monetized.  Thus, the natural capital approach relies 
on traditional economic principles by reducing value comparisons to 
that which is measurable by humankind.  Although not perfectly 
suited for recognizing the esoteric value of nature, the natural capital 
approach is a significantly better model than the gross domestic 
product approach, where the limits of exponential growth within a 
finite system are completely misunderstood.214 
The value systems of indigenous peoples provide another model 
that could be used by FLM agencies.  Vine Deloria, Jr., an American 
Indian author and activist, said that “[w]ithin the traditions, beliefs, 
and customs of the American Indian people are the guidelines for 
society’s future.”215  Decisions about whether ore can be extracted 
economically and whether the land can be withdrawn from 
development could be informed by taking value of the place, the 
whole biotic community, into consideration.  For example, decision 
making by many traditional American Indians considers the impact 
seven generations into the future and the interrelation and mutual 
dependence of humans and nature, a concept sometimes called the 
principle of universal reciprocity.216  “Indigenous knowledges offer 
insights into living well on Mother Earth because they are 
fundamentally cooperative and collaborative constructions.”217  
Modern ecologists distinguish this as a holistic, reciprocating 
possession—a community of people, soils, water, plants, and animals, 
or collectively, the land.218  Mining economists should include the 
 
214 Id. at 9–13. 
215 VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED 295 (Fulcrom Publ’g 2003) (1973); see also Mary 
Christina Wood & Zachary Welcker, Tribes as Trustees Again (Part I): The Emerging 
Tribal Role in the Conservation Trust Movement, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 373, 428 
(2008). 
216 Ragsdale, supra note 2, at 915. 
217 DANIEL R. WILDCAT, RED ALERT!  SAVING THE PLANET WITH INDIGENOUS 
KNOWLEDGE 77 (2009).  Mr. Wildcat posits that “[i]ndigenous knowledges . . . are 
emergent from the nature-culture nexus.  Consequently, indigenous knowledges are a set 
of relations and relationships situated in our life experiences, which vary as we move 
through what physicists would call space-time.”  Id. at 73–74. 
218 Ragsdale, supra note 2, at 917 (quoting Aldo Leopold, who said, “‘a thing is right 
when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community.  It is 
wrong when it tends otherwise’”).  Aldo Leopold was one of the greatest ecologists of the 
twentieth century.  Professor Ragsdale suggests Leopold’s ideal land ethic is “probably 
impossible as a political matter . . . leav[ing] humans with few economic options other 
than subsistence-level hunting, gathering, and dry farming.”  Id. at 917.  Leopold’s land 
ethic is susceptible to such radical interpretations.  However, the land ethic includes an  
 2010] Developing a Sustainable Hardrock Mining and  169 
Mineral Processing Industry 
natural capital approach and traditional American Indian value 
judgments in their practice to help inform FLM agency decision 
makers.  Nevertheless, ethical land valuations cannot ignore classical 
economic considerations; sustainable mining must internalize 
prosperity for the miners and the local mining communities, protect 
international marketability, and address the control, reuse, and 
disposal of mining wastes. 
B.  Protect Natural Capital: Reform the General Mining Law of 
1872 and Rely on Environmental Laws and Federal Indian Law 
The nation behaves well if it treats the natural resources as assets 
which it must turn over to the next generation increased, and not 
impaired, in value. 
~ Theodore Roosevelt219 
The proposed HMRA220 is a new iteration of a perennial effort to 
reform the General Mining Law of 1872, an antiquated law in need of 
major reform.  Created during the industrial revolution era, it simply 
prolongs “[i]ndustrial behavior [that] routinely causes natural 
 
important preface, a cautionary particular truth that economic theory alone is insufficient 
to solve land use problems.  The whole paragraph includes economics, i.e., measuring 
human prosperity, in the problem-solving ethic.  See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY 
ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 224–25 (1949) (“The ‘key-log’ which must 
be moved to release the evolutionary process for an ethic is simply this: quit thinking 
about decent land-use as solely an economic problem.  Examine each question in terms of 
what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient.  A thing 
is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community.  It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”). 
219 U.S. EPA, Sustainability, http://yosemite.epa.gov/r10/oi.nsf/sustainability/ 
sustainability (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
220 Hardrock Mining and Reformation Act of 2009, S. 796, 111th Cong. (2009).  In 
addition to the proposed Senate Bill 796, Senator Feinstein proposed a mining reform bill 
focused on collection of royalties, fees and development of a reclamation fund.  See 
Abandoned Mine Reclamation Act of 2009, S. 140, 111th Cong. (2009).  Senator 
Feinstein’s bill is less comprehensive than the Senate Bill 796 because while it addresses 
mineral development and sets up a trust fund for abandoned mines, see id. §§ 101–104, 
201–206, it does not contain any provisions for withdrawal of treasured national 
landscapes.  Compare id. with S. 796, § 307.  Also, equally troubling, Senate Bill 140 
would allow reclamation and restoration activities with the mere concurrence of the EPA 
to qualify as a Superfund removal or remedial action.  See id. § 203(e); see also infra note 
228 and accompanying text. 
 170 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 25, 123 
imbalance resulting in extinctions, pollution, deforestation, and global 
climate change.”221 
The HMRA proposes to protect natural capital based on a 
conservation, preservation, and restoration (CPR) land ethic.222 For 
example, the HMRA would collect royalties; charge access and 
permit fees; terminate the General Mining Law of 1872 fee land 
patent scheme, the sale of federal mineral lands for $2.50 per acre; 
and require financial assurances based on the full cost of reclamation 
and restoration.223  Hardrock mining and mineral processing 
operations take irreplaceable natural capital and destroy nature in the 
process.  A CPR land ethic manages such exploitation of natural 
capital by: “(1) building societies based on conservation, not waste, 
(2) preserving what we can’t replace, and (3) working with nature to 
help restore what we have degraded or destroyed.”224  The new fees, 
royalties, and financial assurance in the HMRA protect natural 
capital, including subsurface ore bodies and surface real estate, in a 
manner consistent with a CPR land ethic by conserving ore and 
reclaiming and restoring nature in the aftermath of mining.  
Moreover, this proposed law would generate an estimated $1.6 billion 
for the government in royalties and fees over the next ten years.225  
 
221 Wood & Welker, supra note 215, at 389.  In addition, the EPA has quantified the 
contribution of greenhouse gases from the mining sector.  See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, QUANTIFYING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM KEY INDUSTRIAL SECTORS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 11-1 to 11-2, tbl.11-1 (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
ispd/pdf/greenhouse-report.pdf.  In 2002, the total green house gas emissions from the 
mining sector was estimated to be ninety-nine million metric tons carbon dioxide 
equivalent emissions, which is five percent of the U.S. industrial emissions.  Id. at 11-1. 
222 David Brower, one of the founding elders of the twentieth century American 
environmental movement coined the term “CPR” for environmentalists.  Cf. PLATER ET 
AL., supra note 3, at 20. 
223 See S. 796. 
224 PLATER ET AL., supra note 3, at 20. 
225 Cf. THE PEW CAMPAIGN FOR RESPONSIBLE MINING, REFORMING THE U.S. 
HARDROCK MINING LAW OF 1872: THE PRICE OF INACTION 2 (2009), 
http://www.pewmining reform.org/pdf/cost_of_inaction.pdf.  Senate Bill 796 proposes a 
royalty rate ranging between two and five percent, see section 201(a), while the House 
version proposes eight percent.  Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2009, H.R. 699, 
111th Cong. § 102(a)(1) (2009).  Senator Feinstein’s bill also proposes eight percent.  
Abandoned Mine Reclamation Act of 2009, S. 140, 111th Cong. § 101(a)(1) (2009).  A 
higher rate would be better for the taxpayers.  However, determining an appropriate 
royalty rate is difficult because the federal government needs information on the 
relationship between ore production and royalties.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, HARDROCK MINING: INFORMATION ON STATE ROYALTIES AND TRENDS IN 
MINERAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 1–5 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d08849r.pdf. 
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The proposed HMRA supports sustainable development of this 
industry and protects natural capital from unnecessary and undue 
degradation. 
The proposed HMRA also reflects essential government 
responsibilities that stem from the public trust doctrine, which is a 
foundational principle for good governance of public lands and public 
goods, such as forests, water, and minerals.226  This doctrine is based 
on ancient Western social traditions where the government is 
accountable for vital resources and essentially places public land, 
water, and minerals in trust for the public benefit now and in the 
future.227  Because the General Mining Law of 1872 allows the 
mining industry free and open access to public lands and minerals, it 
externalizes the costs of reclamation and gives away public goods for 
free.  The proposed fees and royalty provisions are fair and simply 
codify the government’s public trust responsibilities.  In summary, the 
proposed law enhances federal natural resources law by recognizing 
the public trust doctrine. 
In stark contrast, the proposed HMRA does not enhance, but rather 
confounds environmental laws and federal Indian law.  Certain 
provisions in the HMRA conflict with environmental protections 
guaranteed under federal environmental laws including CERCLA, the 
CWA, and federal Indian law. 
1.  CERCLA 
The proposed HMRA creates a potential loophole in the CERCLA 
federal facility cleanup program.  Deceptively harmonious, the 
proposed HMRA states that any activities specified in the reclamation 
plan “that constitute removal or remedial action under section 101 of 
 
226 See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVTL. LAW: AIR AND WATER, § 2.20, (1986) 
(setting forth the contours of the doctrine and seminal works and cases discussing its 
scope).  Most famous among the cases dealing with the ecological protections is the 1983 
Mono Lake case, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 
709 (Cal. 1983), in which the California Supreme Court pronounced the foundations of the 
doctrine as it applies to issues of water quality and quantity, and equally compelling is the 
United States Supreme Court’s precedent setting case, Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. 
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
227 Wood & Welker, supra note 215, at 385.  Nevertheless, for several centuries, 
especially after the Industrial Revolution, the dominant society in the United States 
suffered from a kind of “industrial thinking,” characterized by consumption and rewards 
through accumulation.  Id. at 389. 
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[CERCLA]” shall only be conducted in concurrence with the EPA.228  
Furthermore, the DOI and the EPA would enter into a memorandum 
of understanding to assure “[r]eclamation or restoration activities 
under this [Act] shall not be conducted in a manner that—(A) 
increases the costs or likelihood of removal or remedial actions under 
[CERCLA]; or (B) to the maximum extent practicable, avoids 
oversight by multiple agencies.”229  The HMRA also states that 
existing environmental laws are not superseded.230  Nevertheless, 
these provisions create ambiguity and conflict between FLM agencies 
and the EPA and, most disturbing, imply a repeal of CERCLA for 
AMLs.231 
CERCLA requires FLM agencies comply with its implementing 
regulations and the National Contingency Plan232 when evaluating 
federal facilities where hazardous substances are located (with minor 
exceptions).233  Federal facility Superfund remedial actions 
investigations and studies must be reviewed by the EPA, and 
“[w]ithin 180 days thereafter, the [FLM agencies] shall enter into an 
interagency agreement with the [EPA] for the expeditious completion 
. . . of all necessary remedial action at such facility.”234  The 
concurrence of the EPA Administrator and a memorandum of 
understanding between the FLM agency and the EPA provide no 
guarantee that the cleanup of AMLs will be conducted in a manner 
consistent with CERCLA’s federal facility provisions.  The EPA’s 
oversight of the FLM agency is essential.  It is not a duplication of 
effort.  The lax provisions of the HMRA do not guarantee that the 
FLM agency’s actions will be consistent with CERCLA.  The 
confounding language in section 402(g) should be omitted or revised 
to insure compliance with CERCLA and eliminate any potential 
loopholes, conflicts, or implied repeal of CERCLA. 
 
228 See S. 796, § 402(g); see also S. 140, § 203(e) (proposing similar language). 
229 S. 796, § 402(g). 
230 Id. § 506(c)(2). 
231 Compare Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act of 1980 (CERCLA) § 120(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9620(e)(2) (2006) (requiring an 
interagency agreement for federal facility cleanups), with S. 796, § 402(g)(2) (requiring 
only a memorandum of understanding for such cleanups). 
232 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2009). 
233 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(2)–(3). 
234 Id. § 9620(e)(2). 
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2.  CWA 
The HMRA proposed surface water cleanup standards conflicts 
with the CWA.  A mining permittee’s operations plan need only 
demonstrate that “the formation of acid mine drainage will be avoided 
to the maximum extent practicable . . . .”235  Although the proposed 
HMRA explicitly states that existing environmental laws are not 
superseded by that Act,236 the phrase “to the maximum extent 
practicable” would effectively circumvent CWA restrictions.  For 
example, permitting agencies would not be able to require compliance 
with applicable water quality standards when compliance would be 
impractical for the facility.  The proposed HMRA standard should 
instead state that any acid mine drainage discharge shall be avoided to 
the maximum extent practicable and shall be in compliance with the 
CWA and any other applicable state, tribal, and federal environmental 
laws. 
In summary, the DOI and the U.S. Forest Service are FML 
agencies that develop natural capital, while the EPA protects human 
health and the environment.  The proposed HMRA needs revision 
where it authorizes the DOI and the U.S. Forest Service to supervise 
environmental management of mining wastes to avoid creating a 
sectoral approach to government oversight of this industry.237  The 
proposed HMRA usurps the authority given to FML agencies under 
existing environmental laws, which creates conflict and ambiguity.  
The EPA oversees waste management and environmental protections 
and should be entrusted with this responsibility.  The HMRA should 
reflect an integral approach to governing mining waste management 
practices. 
3.  Conflict with Federal Indian Law 
Mining and mineral processing operations impact significant 
numbers of native people.  Worldwide, three million indigenous 
people are directly impacted by mining.238  Recognizing and 
 
235 See S. 796, § 303(b)(2)(B); see also id. § 302(c)(1)(B) (requiring the same 
demonstration for an exploration plan). 
236 See id. § 506(c)(2). 
237 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. 
238 INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., MINING MINERALS AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT NORTH AMERICA: TOWARDS CHANGE, THE WORK AND RESULTS OF 
MMSD—NORTH AMERICA 1 (2002). 
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supporting tribal sovereignty239 is an important component in 
modernizing federal natural resource laws, especially in light of the 
disproportionate impact the mining industry has on the health and 
environment in Indian country.240  For example, the Navajo Indian 
people suffer a painful legacy as a result of the uranium mining on 
their reservation.241 
The HMRA recognizes tribal sovereignty over Indian land, but not 
Indian country as defined in federal Indian law statutes.  The term 
“Indian country” means: 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running 
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities 
within the borders of the United States whether within the original 
or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or 
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian 
titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way 
running through the same.242 
In contrast, the HMRA uses the term “Indian land” and defines it 
narrowly as “land that is—(A) held in trust for the benefit of an 
Indian tribe or member of an Indian tribe; or (B) held by an Indian 
 
239 The sovereignty of Indian tribes is an established principle in federal statutes and 
common law precedents.  See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) 
(denominating tribes as “domestic dependent nations”); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 
Pet.) 515, 559–60 (1832) (“The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, 
independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed 
possessors of the soil, from time immemorial . . . . The words ‘treaty’ and ‘nation’ are 
words of our own language . . . . We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied 
them to the other nations of the earth.  They are applied to all in the same sense.”); see 
also DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 124–
25 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing the Worcester decision and Justice Marshall’s emphasis on 
the tribe’s “retained powers of ‘self-government’”.). 
240 Cf. U.S. EPA, Waste Management in Indian Country, Publications, 
http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/wycd/tribal/resource.htm (last visited on Mar. 5, 2010). 
241 See BENALLY MORONI ET AL., DINÉ POLICY INST., URANIUM AND DINÉ 
BINITSEKEES, AN ANALYSIS OF THE DIRECT AND IN-DIRECT CONSEQUENCES OF 
URANIUM USING NAVAJO PRINCIPLES 2 (undated) (“The legacy uranium mining left on 
the Navajo Nation has been one of gloom and darkness.  It has been estimated that from 
1994–1986, 3.9 million tons of uranium ore was mined from the Navajo Nation.  The 
consequence of this uranium mining has been felt locally and internationally.  As of 1990, 
500–600 uranium miners on Navajo Nation have succumbed to death because of lung 
cancer and other illnesses associated with radon exposure.  It has been estimated that at the 
end of 2000 another 500–600 miners have died.”). 
242 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006) (defining “Indian country”). 
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tribe or member of an Indian tribe, subject to a restriction by the 
United States against alienation.”243 
In addition, the HMRA creates an Abandoned Mine Land Trust 
Fund and a Hardrock Reclamation Program, which FML agencies, 
states, and tribes may use “for the reclamation and restoration of land 
and water resources adversely affected by past hardrock minerals and 
mining and related activities in abandoned hardrock mine States and 
on Indian land located within the exterior boundaries of abandoned 
hardrock mine States.”244  States and Indian tribes may establish 
reclamation programs when “mined land that is eligible for 
reclamation under this [statute]” is located “within the borders of the 
State, or . . . within the borders of the reservation of the tribe.”245  
Reading the definitions provided in HMRA sections 401 and 402 
together, the proposed HMRA could authorize a state reclamation 
program on patent or fee lands within the borders of an Indian 
reservation or on dependent Indian communities.  This would be in 
blatant disregard of tribal sovereignty over Indian country. 
The federal government and tribal sovereigns exercise power and 
jurisdiction to protect human health and the environment in Indian 
country, including all land within the borders of their reservations.246  
 
243 Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2009, S. 796, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). 
244 Id. § 402(a)(1) (setting forth permissible uses of the Hardrock Minerals Reclamation 
Fund) (emphasis added); see also id. § 2 (“The term ‘abandoned hardrock mine State’ 
means each of the States of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and 
Wyoming.”). 
245 Id. § 401(e). 
246 It is well established that federal laws can apply to Indians and Indian country.  E.g., 
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960); see also Judith 
V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal 
Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REV. 581, 
591–93 (1989) (discussing the application of the Tuscarora rule to general federal laws 
including environmental laws).  The early nineteenth century Supreme Court generally 
held that federal laws, like state laws, were not applicable to natives within Indian country; 
however, in Tuscarora, the Court held that absent a treaty or federal statute to the contrary, 
federal laws of general applicability apply to natives and to native tribes, stating that “we 
must hold that Congress, by the broad general terms of [section] 21 of the Federal Power 
Act, has authorized the Federal Power Commission's licensees to take lands owned by 
Indians, as well as those of all other citizens, when needed for a licensed project, upon the 
payment of just compensation; that the lands in question are not subject to any treaty 
between the United States and the Tuscaroras . . . .”  Fed. Power Comm’n, 362 U.S. at 
123–24.  Many federal environmental laws acknowledge tribal sovereignty, for example, 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1972, 7 U.S.C. § 136u (2006), 
and most authorize the EPA to treat Indian tribes in a manner similar to states.  E.g., Clean  
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Thus, the HMRA should recognize that tribal governments are the 
appropriate governing body to implement a reclamation program 
within Indian country and not the states. 
In general, state governments lack authority over environmental 
regulatory matters in Indian country absent an express grant from 
Congress.247  Nevertheless, the federal judiciary has divested tribes of 
some jurisdiction in Indian country.248  For example, tribes, depending 
on a number of factors, may not have jurisdiction over non-Indians 
and their activities.249  Despite this judicial encroachment on tribal 
sovereignty, the body of federal Indian law supports tribal authority 
over land within the exterior boundaries of a reservation when an 
activity impacts tribal sovereign interests by threatening, or having 
 
Water Act § 518, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-
11 (2006); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9626; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7474, 7601; cf. 
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (holding that the 
intent to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to Congress). 
247 The role of state governments in environmental regulatory programs in Indian 
country is essentially a very limited one.  Absent an explicit authorization from Congress 
granting a state regulatory authority, which rarely occurs, state environmental regulatory 
programs are not valid in Indian country whether aimed at Indians or non-Indians, on tribal 
lands or fee lands.  See Royster & Fausett, supra note 246, at 613–59; Cal. v. Cabazon 
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987) (“[S]tate laws may be applied to tribal 
Indians on their reservations if Congress has expressly so provided.”); William D. 
Ruckelshaus, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Policy for the Administration of Environmental 
Programs on Indian Reservations 2 (Nov. 8, 1984) (emphasis added), 
http://www.epa.gov/indian/pdf/indian-policy-84.pdf (setting forth the EPA’s Indian Policy 
to encourage tribal self-determination, to “work directly with Indian Tribal Governments 
on a one-to-one basis,” to “recognize[] Tribal Governments as sovereign entities with 
primary authority and responsibility for the reservation populace,” and “[u]ntil Tribal 
Governments are willing and able to assume full responsibility for delegable programs, the 
Agency will retain responsibility for managing programs for reservations (unless the State 
has an express grant of jurisdiction from Congress sufficient to support delegation to the 
State Government)”) [hereinafter EPA Indian Policy]. 
248 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 560 (1981); see also Strate v. A-1 
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & 
Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008). 
249 In Montana v. United States, the Court crafted a new general rule that states may 
exercise authority over nonmembers within Indian country unless nonmembers “enter any 
agreements or dealings with the [Tribe] so as to subject themselves to tribal civil 
jurisdiction” or when “conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, 
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”  See 540 U.S. at 566.  These 
two exceptions are known as the Montana test exceptions.  E.g., Plains Commerce Bank, 
128 S. Ct. at 2720 (These rules have become known as the Montana exceptions, after the 
case that elaborated them.  By their terms, the exceptions concern regulation of “the 
activities of nonmembers” or “the conduct of non-Indians on fee land.”). 
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some direct effect on, the political integrity, the economic security, or 
the health or welfare of the tribe.250  In other words, the limitation on 
tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian activities is generally overcome by 
the second Montana test exception in circumstances where the 
activities involve environmental protection.251  For example, the EPA 
has generalized findings that establish tribal environmental regulatory 
programs may address serious and substantial impacts on human 
health and welfare.252 
The proposed HMRA limits tribal authority by distorting well-
known terminology.  The HMRA changes the phrase “within the 
exterior boundaries of reservations,” into the unrecognizable “Indian 
land located within the exterior boundaries of [14] abandoned 
hardrock mine States,”253 and defines Indian lands narrowly.254  
Potentially, tribal authority to implement the reclamation program 
over dependent Indian communities could be limited, where state 
authority would be allowed.  Also, a state reclamation program could 
possibly apply in a checkerboard pattern within Indian reservations, 
depending on the land status (e.g., trust land, public land, or patent 
and fee lands).  The proposed statutory language conflicts with the 
 
250 Montana, 450 U.S. at 565–66. 
251 Id.  Additionally, the courts have upheld the EPA’s decision to approve tribal 
environmental programs within Indian country based on the serious and substantial 
impacts of pollution on the health and welfare of the tribes.  See Montana v. EPA, 137 
F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998); Wisconsin v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741, 750 (7th Cir. 2001). 
252 See Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation That Pertain to 
Standards on Indian Reservations, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,877, 64,877–78 (Dec. 12, 1991) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 361) (discussing in-depth the application of the Montana test 
with respect to EPA regulations on tribal eligibility to implement CWA programs in the 
same manner as states).  This rule states that “the ultimate decision regarding Tribal 
authority must be made on a Tribe-by-Tribe basis,” and clarifies that the EPA reads the 
second Montana exception as requiring “a showing that the potential impacts of regulated 
activities on the tribe are serious and substantial.”  Id. at 64,878.  The EPA stated further 
that “activities regulated under the various environmental statutes generally have serious 
and substantial impacts on human health and welfare” and, accordingly, “tribes will 
usually be able to meet the Agency’s operating rule.”  Id.  EPA also observed that because 
of the mobile nature of pollutants, non-Indian activities on fee land is very likely to affect 
tribal lands.  Id.  Furthermore, at least three federal circuit courts have upheld the 
Agency’s generalized findings, the tribes’ inherent authority, and that states were not 
authorized to implement the program.  See Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 426–27 
(10th Cir. 1996); Montana, 137 F.3d at 1141; Wisconsin, 266 F.3d at 750. 
253 Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2009, S. 796, 111th Cong. § 402(a)(1) 
(2009). 
254 Id. § 2(1). 
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principle that tribal governments are “sovereign entities with primary 
authority and responsibility for [their] reservation” environments, as 
illustrated in EPA policies.255  Even the Surface Mining, Control, and 
Reclamation Act of 1977 provides for tribal programs within the 
exterior boundaries of reservations.256  The HMRA is antithetical to 
this fundamental precept of federal Indian law.  Perhaps, the proposed 
HMRA language limiting tribal authority to trust lands is simply a 
result of avant-garde interpretations of the Supreme Court’s trend 
towards greater judicial divesture of tribal sovereignty.257 
On the other hand, perhaps, the tortured language in the proposed 
HMRA came at the behest of the uranium mining industry.  Hydro 
Resources, Inc. is seeking to mine uranium within a Navajo Nation 
dependent Indian community, known as the Church Rock Chapter, 
located just outside the reservation boundaries.258  Hydro Resources, 
Inc. lost a lawsuit against the EPA, where the company alleged that 
land it owned within Church Rock Chapter was not Indian country 
and therefore, was regulated by the State of New Mexico.259  This 
case was about the definition of Indian country and dependent Indian 
communities, and not the Montana test exceptions.260  Nevertheless, 
the court held that the land in question is Indian country.261  Thus, the 
EPA has regulatory control unless and until the Navajo Nation obtains 
 
255 See EPA Indian Policy, supra note 247, at 2 (“EPA recognizes Tribal Governments 
as sovereign entities with primary authority and responsibility for the reservation 
populace.”). 
256 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1291(9) (2006) (“‘Indian 
lands’ means all lands, including mineral interests, within the exterior boundaries of any 
Federal Indian reservation, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and including 
rights-of-way, and all lands including mineral interests held in trust for or supervised by an 
Indian tribe . . . .”). 
257 See Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism 
and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1178 (2001) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s trend “of divesting tribes of jurisdiction over non-tribal members and permitting 
increasingly onerous forms of state regulation within tribal territorial boundaries”). 
258 Hydro Res. Inc. v. EPA, 562 F.3d 1249, 1267 (10th Cir. 2009) (upholding the EPA 
decision that the agency, and not the State of New Mexico, is the proper authority to issue 
any underground injection permit under the Safe Drinking Water Act). 
259 Id. at 1258.  The planned mining activity included the need for an Underground 
Injection Control Permit for waste disposal.  Id.  Possibly, as a result of this decision, the 
Navajo Nation ban on all uranium mining could apply to the mining activity planned by 
HRI.  Cf. Kathy Holms, Navajo Celebrates HRI Ruling, INDEPENDENT (Gallup, N.M.), 
Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.gallupindependent.com/2009/04April042209navajocelebrates 
.html. 
260 See Hydro Res., 562 F.3d at 1258–68. 
261 See id. at 1267–68. 
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authorization to implement environmental programs.  If the HMRA 
definition of Indian land, which excludes dependent Indian 
communities, ever becomes law, the HMRA could provide New 
Mexico with the authority necessary to regulate hardrock mining 
within the Church Rock Chapter and exclude the Navajo Nation. 
In summary, the proposed HMRA definitions of Indian lands and 
limitations on uses of the reclamation fund need to be consistent with 
the federal Indian law definitions of Indian country.  When possible, 
statutory consistency avoids confusion in Indian country, where real 
property ownership is a checkerboard pattern of Indian trust lands, 
non-Indian fee lands, and individual Indian allotments.262  Using the 
term “Indian lands” is imprecise and could limit federal and tribal 
authority.  Specifically, the proposed HMRA should replace the term 
“Indian lands” with “Indian country” and define it by reference to the 
legal definition that appears in the U.S. criminal code.263 Further, the 
bill should delete the phrase, “Indian land located within the exterior 
boundaries of abandoned hardrock mine States.”264 
V 
SUSTAINABLE MINING PROMOTES GLOBAL PROSPERITY 
Sustainable development of the mining and mineral processing 
industry is an international goal.  The concept is entirely consistent 
with the ambitious Agenda 21 developed at the U.N. Conference on 
Environment and Development held in Rio de Janerio, Brazil, in 
1992.265  Agenda 21 moves the international community to 
comprehensive planning for the twenty-one ways in which humans 
impact the environment.266  For example, Agenda 21 promotes 
 
262 See generally Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian 
Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (illustrating of this checkerboard pattern of land use within a 
reservation and the confusion it creates). 
263 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006). 
264 See Hardrock Mining and Reclamation Act of 2009, S. 796, 111th Cong. § 402(a)(1) 
(2009). 
265 See U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Div. for Sustainable Dev., Agenda 21, 
http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/ (“Agenda 21 is a comprehensive plan of action to be 
taken globally, nationally and locally by organizations of the United Nations System, 
Governments, and Major Groups in every area in which human impacts on the 
environment.”). 
266 See Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development; Statement of Forest Principles: The Final 
Text of Agreements Negotiated by Governments at the United Nations Conference on  
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sustainable mining through an “integrated approach to the planning 
and management of land resources.”267  The international community 
is committed to an integrated management approach and a 
conservation, preservation, and restoration ethic for land development 
decisions in conjunction with an open multilateral trading system.268  
Nevertheless, international trade regimes, such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), resist their responsibility to protect human 
health and the environment on a global scale.269  Each nation is 
responsible for integrating environmental protections into global 
trading systems.  For example, the U.S. government could promote 
free and fair trade rules that protect the environment and govern 
natural resources such as heavy metals and mineral commodities. 
Environmental and international trade policy makers could 
carefully craft natural resource protection trade measures and barriers 
without compromising global economic objectives like 
antiprotectionism.  WTO members from developing countries may 
challenge resource protection schemes as a restriction on free trade; 
however, WTO rules allow members to protect the environment and 
their natural resources.270  These trade measures are necessary 
 
Environment and Development, 3–14 June, 1992, Rio De Janeiro, Brazil, ch. 17.1, U.N. 
Sales No. E.93I.11 (1993). 
267 See id. at ch. 10, § 10.2. 
268 Id. at ch. 2, § 2.19 (“Environment and trade policies should be mutually supportive. 
An open, multilateral trading system makes possible a more efficient allocation and use of 
resources and thereby contributes to an increase in production and incomes and to 
lessening demands on the environment.  It thus provides additional resources needed for 
economic growth and development and improved environmental protection.  A sound 
environment, on the other hand, provides the ecological and other resources needed to 
sustain growth and underpin a continuing expansion of trade.  An open, multilateral 
trading system, supported by the adoption of sound environmental policies, would have a 
positive impact on the environment and contribute to sustainable development.”). 
269 Whether or not the WTO members want this added responsibility, it is part of their 
agreements.  See id.; see also Andrew Green, Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and 
How Constraining Are Trade Rules?, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 143 (2005) (“[E]xisting WTO 
rules provide members with some scope to take action on climate change.  However, they 
do constrain domestic regulatory policy, and the debate about future institutional changes 
will be central to how effectively global environmental issues such as climate change will 
be addressed.”); Andrew Green & Tracey Epps, The WTO, Science, and the Environment: 
Moving Towards Consistency, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 285 (2007) (providing an in-depth 
discussion on the interconnection between environmental challenges and the WTO). 
270 For example, WTO rules provide general exceptions that allow discriminatory 
measures provided they fall under a listed category in Article XX (a) through (j) and 
withstand the requirements of the chapeau (introductory clause) to Article XX.  See JOHN 
H. JACKSON ET AL., 2002 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 45 (4th ed. 2002) (“Subject to the requirement  
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because mining law reforms may lead to legislative and regulatory 
changes that charge permitting fees, collect royalties, require financial 
assurances, institute taxes, and generally force this industry to 
internalize the costs of pollution control, natural capital depletion, and 
loss of access to minerals in preserved special places.271  Utilizing 
cost internalization to protect the environment and natural capital 
should not place the U.S. economy at a competitive disadvantage in 
the international marketplace.  The U.S. government should balance 
the objectives of free trade and environmental protectionism. 
Multinational corporations operating mines and mineral processing 
facilities inside the United States must comply with federal 
environmental, health and safety regulations, and similar state 
requirements.272  Some industrialists claim that such requirements are 
unfair trade measures.273  A Canadian corporation, Glamis Gold Ltd. 
and Glamis Imperial Corporation (Glamis), submitted a fifty million 
dollar compensation claim to arbitration under NAFTA rules alleging 
injuries related to a proposed cyanide heap leach gold mine in 
California.274  Glamis claimed the BLM actions and California 
measures regulating open-pit mining operations (1) failed to accord 
its investments fair and equitable treatment and full protection and 
security in accordance with international law, and (2) expropriated its 
 
that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (a) 
necessary to protect public morals; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health . . . (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption 
. . . .”). 
271 Cf. Hardrock Mining and Restoration Act of 2009, S. 796, 111th Cong. tit. I, II, III 
(2009). 
272 E.g., Clean Water Act § 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 440.100–.105 
(2009) (including technology limitations and NPDES permits for copper, lead, zinc, gold, 
silver, and molybdenum ores subcategory); see also Surface Mining and Reclamation Act 
of 1975, Cal. Pub. Resources Code §§ 2710–3948 (requiring plan of operations and 
backfilling open pit mines under California laws). 
273 For example, certain barriers to free trade under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement.  See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 270, at 45. 
274 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Cases Filed Against the United States of America, Glamis 
Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, http://www.state.gov/s/l/c10986.htm (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2010); see also Jack Caldwell, Glamis Gold v. Schwarzenegger: Tackling the 
Terminator via NAFTA, Aug. 13, 2007, http://ithink.mining.com/2007/08/13/glamis-gold  
-v-schwarzenegger-tackling-the-terminator-via-nafta/. 
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investments in contravention of specific provisions of NAFTA.275  
California and the BLM were not only concerned with protecting the 
environment, but also protecting an historic and sacred site located in 
the project area.276  The protections they sought involved backfilling 
mine wastes and regrading after mining to return the land to relatively 
normal contours.  As one group has suggested, “[T]he Glamis case 
study dramatically demonstrates the way in which international 
investment agreements can undercut efforts to protect the public 
interest in the mining sector. . . .”277 
The NAFTA tribunal held a hearing on the merits and, in June 
2009, determined that regulating hardrock mining to protect the 
environment and a sacred site does not violate NAFTA, upholding the 
U.S. position.278  The tribunal agreed with the United States that 
“[c]ustomary international law recognizes that, as a general matter, 
States are not liable to compensate aliens for economic loss incurred 
as a result of nondiscriminatory environmental regulatory measures to 
protect, inter alia, the public health.”279  In general, hardrock mining 
and mineral processing operations inside the United States must 
 
275 See Notice of  Arbitration of Glamis Gold Ltd. at 3–4, Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United 
States of America (Dec. 9, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization 127320.pdf; see also North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 639–40 (1993). 
276 The U.S. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation concluded that the Glamis mine 
“would result in irreparable degradation of the sacred and historic values” of the land, 
which the Quechan Indian people consider a sacred site.  See Memorandum from the 
Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to the Secretary 5 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at 
http://www.doi.gov/solicitor/opinions/M-37007.pdf (quoting Letter from Cathryn Buford 
Slater, Chairman, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, to Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, 
Dep’t of the Interior 3 (Oct. 19, 1999)).  The Council advised the Bureau of Land 
Management to “take whatever legal means available to deny the proposal for the project.”  
Id. 
277 OXFAM AMERICA ET AL., GLAMIS GOLD: A CASE STUDY OF INVESTING IN 
DESTRUCTION 1 (2003), available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/files/OA-Glamis 
_Gold_English .pdf. 
278 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, NAFTA Tribunal Dismisses Glamis Case 
(June 9, 2009), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/06a/124527.htm; see also Indian 
Law Resource Center, NAFTA Tribunal Recognizes Sacred Places of Quechan Tribe, 
Denies Glamis Gold’s Claim In Full, June 9, 2009, http://www.indianlaw.org/node/424. 
279 Statement of Defense of Respondent U.S.A. at 20 ¶ 56, Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United 
States of America (Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/45118.pdf. 
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comply with federal and state environmental laws that apply 
regardless of the nationality of the owner/operator.280 
The United States should seek WTO reforms that incorporate 
environmental protections and develop meaningful environmental 
provisions in regional free trade agreements to protect the domestic 
mining industry from cheap imported mineral commodities from 
countries where the mining industry is not regulated.  Multilateral 
international agreements and treaties could establish international 
standards for waste management at mining and mineral processing 
operations.  In addition, Congress could enact a fair trade measure or 
tariff on mineral commodities imported to the United States from 
noncompliant countries.  This would be an appropriate response to 
countries that fail to establish and enforce environmental protection 
standards and export inferior products that allow companies to 
externalize costs through pollution of the commons.  A trade measure 
can level the playing field, provided it does not promote 
discrimination, unfair trade, or protectionism. 
The obstacles to a level playing field are considerable because 
trade measures or tariffs are frowned upon in the international 
commercial law community.281  Yet, a trade measure designed to 
encourage countries to protect human health could also protect fair 
trade.  A trade measure enacted for the hardrock mining and mineral 
 
280 E.g., Clean Water Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (prohibiting the discharge of 
pollution into waters of the U.S. by any person); id. § 1362(5) (defining a “person” to 
include any “individual, corporation, partnership, association . . . .”).  Additionally, a 
foreign person who owns or operates a facility or causes pollution inside the United States 
may be liable under U.S. laws.  See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 
1066, 1079 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We hold that applying CERCLA here to the release of 
hazardous substances at the Site is a domestic, rather than an extraterritorial application of 
CERCLA, even though the original source of the hazardous substances is located in a 
foreign country.”). 
281 See MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:  LAW, 
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 440–47 (2003).  “[T]he WTO is sensitive to uncovering measures 
that purport to be for environmental reasons but are a subterfuge for serving other 
interests, such as protection of domestic producers.  Id. at 441.  However, in the case of 
ore and mineral processing industries, the WTO recognizes the need to protect exhaustible 
natural resources.  See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 270, at 45 (“[T]his Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting parties of measures:   
. . . (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are 
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption      
. . . .”). 
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processing industry would have to avoid protectionism that 
discriminates unfairly against imported products.282 
A successful trade measure could control or limit importation of 
hardrock metals that are produced using environmentally unsound 
methods.  Such trade restrictions on nonproduct related process and 
production methods may be achieved with tariffs or an ecolabel on 
the product; such measures are necessary for a complex world 
market.283 
By designing successful trade measures or tariffs, U.S. leadership 
could enhance international acceptance of environmental and natural 
capital safeguards for the mining and mineral processing industry.284  
International traders value free trade almost as much as they value a 
level playing field where exporters, or importers by trade measures, 
internalize the externalities such as pollution controls.  Trade 
measures are simply a cost that monetizes the value of a level playing 
field.  Trade can’t be free at all costs.285 
The United States can renew its position as a world leader in 
environmental protection law and policy and establish its presence in 
the worldwide sustainable development movement by preserving 
natural landscapes, developing hardrock waste management 
standards, reforming old mining laws and seeking agreement among 
global trading partners to control and manage toxic wastes from the 
mining and mineral processing industry.  Internationally, sustainable 
development of this industry means establishing environmental and 
social policies and technical compliance standards within the 
international community that inspire the industry to transform 
eighteenth century industrial behavior into twenty-first century 
 
282 The trade measure should not violate the “no less favorable treatment” principle of 
Article III; commonly known as the “most favorable nation” or “MFN” principle.  See 
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 270, at 20 (“National Treatment on Internal Taxation and 
Regulation . . . 4.  The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale . . . .”). 
283 Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences For Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and 
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 624 (2004) ("Rather than 
being scientifically unfounded, nakedly protectionist, or ethically inconsistent, consumer 
process preferences instead offer an important vehicle through which individuals influence 
the world, express their views on public issues, and fashion their moral identity in an era 
of extraordinary interconnectedness, complexity, and dynamism in the market.”). 
284 DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE 202 (2d ed. 2005). 
285 Id. at 243. 
 2010] Developing a Sustainable Hardrock Mining and  185 
Mineral Processing Industry 
sustainable development and put an end to many atrocious mining 
practices.  International trade regimes and future investments, whether 
from private capital, the U.S. government, the International Monetary 
Fund, or the World Bank, should support only those hardrock mining 
and mineral processing facilities that abide by sustainable 
development principles that will protect the environment and cultivate 
social behaviors that support local and indigenous populations.286 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Developing a sustainable hardrock mining industry requires society 
to consider the relative value of the environment, social equity, and 
economic prosperity.  Deciding where, when, and how to allow 
mining and mineral processing operations should no longer be based 
solely on the location of ores.  The gospel of unlimited growth can no 
longer dominate important decisions about the exploitation of the 
earth’s mineral wealth, our natural capital.  Many other considerations 
must guide the siting, operation, and closure of mining and mineral 
processing facilities.  Additional considerations include the 
sustainability principles described in United Nations Agenda 21, 
which include the public trust doctrine, the principle of reciprocating 
procession derived from indigenous knowledge of the traditional 
Native American Indian cultures (fundamentally cooperative and 
collaborative),287 the conservation, preservation and restoration land 
ethic, and the principles of free and fair trade described in the world 
trade systems.  Adapting modern principles to ancient doctrines and 
traditions will guide the sustainable development of hardrock mining 
and mineral processing in appropriate locations with adequate 
protections for human health and the environment, including not only 
preservation of natural landscapes, but significantly mitigate the 
horrible pollution and human health disasters at mining sites 
worldwide.288 
Reforming RCRA, the CWA, and CERCLA promotes an integral 
approach, ensuring that environmental regulation remains in the 
 
286 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 14, at 6; see also OXFAM AMERICA ET AL., 
supra note 277, at 1 (describing challenge under NAFTA in Glamis’s attempt to mine gold 
in a sacred place for the local indigenous people). 
287 See WILDCAT, supra note 217, at 75, 136–37. 
288 See supra notes 8–14 and accompanying text. 
 186 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 25, 123 
hands of the United States’ primary environmental agency, the EPA.  
Updating these laws is necessary to provide resources, authority, and 
programs that facilitate the EPA’s regulation of pollution from active 
and inactive mineral operations and the cleanup of AMLs.  The most 
urgent regulatory action is for the EPA to propose new RCRA 
regulations under section 3004(x).  A regulatory initiative to 
promulgate a new hardrock mining and mineral processing waste 
management program is needed to protect human health, the land, 
surface water, and groundwater.  This program may be part of a larger 
Special Waste Regulatory Initiative to address other special wastes.  
The EPA has not promulgated regulations to control special wastes 
despite over twenty-five years of planning.  And while some facilities 
may believe they are permanently relieved from regulation of toxic 
mining wastes,289 a new special waste program would reverse decades 
of underregulation and decrease the abandonment of mining and 
mineral processing sites, which frequently become Superfund sites. 
The Superfund Program is one of the most effective regulatory 
programs for cleanup of abandoned mine lands; however, the single 
most compelling impediment to the cleanup of these lands “is not 
regulatory but financial.”290  The U.S. government does not need an 
entirely new Abandoned Mine Trust Fund as proposed in the HMRA. 
Instead these cleanups can be readily financed by taking advantage of 
an existing, successful regulatory program—the Superfund.  Congress 
should reinstate the Superfund tax and expand it to include mining 
and mineral processing facilities.  This tax supports the Superfund 
Program, which as a whole supports the integral approach to 
environmental regulation and upholds the polluter pays principle. 
In addition, Congress should amend CERCLA to provide FLM 
agencies with limited access to the Superfund Trust Fund for 
abandoned mine waste cleanup at sites on public lands with no other 
viable responsible party, which would speed cleanups on public lands.  
The Superfund program offers procedural advantages as well.  For 
example, the EPA and the FLM agencies must coordinate on cleanups 
where the EPA is ultimately in charge of remediation and the FLM 
agencies control reclamation and restoration.  Such coordination 
manifests the integral approach where the EPA protects human health 
 
289 Barringer, supra note 32, at 155. 
290 Senate Oversight Hearing, supra note 31, at 64 (statement of Velma M. Smith, 
Senior Policy Associate, National Environmental Trust). 
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and the environment while the FLM agencies assist in development of 
natural capital. 
Further, the government should modernize the General Mining 
Law of 1872.  Reforming natural resource laws will protect natural 
capital and preserve natural landscapes by (1) collecting royalties, 
permit fees, and financial assurances for reclamation and restoration, 
and (2) withdrawing protected locations from mineral activities.  
These reforms should not undermine environmental protections 
otherwise guaranteed under federal environmental laws such as 
RCRA, CERCLA, and the CWA.  Reform of mining laws should not 
duplicate a new special waste management program under RCRA or a 
new Superfund tax.  Finally, the reforms to mining laws need not 
attack tribal sovereignty. Instead, regulatory authority of sovereign 
tribal governments should be recognized as it is in other laws, such as 
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, the Superfund, and the 
CWA.  Protecting international free and fair trade will also be a vital 
component of sustainable hardrock mining.  The government should 
protect U.S. positions in the international market for heavy metals and 
mineral commodities.  The U.S. mining and mineral processing 
industry should not lose a competitive edge to South America, 
Canada, Africa, or other regions or nations that may be unfettered by 
natural capital protection and environmental regulation.  Mining law 
reforms may lead to legislative and regulatory changes that allow 
regulatory agencies to charge permitting fees, collect royalties or 
taxes, require financial assurances, and generally require this industry 
to internalize the costs of pollution control and natural capital 
depletion.  Again, these costs should not put U.S. industry at a 
competitive disadvantage in the international marketplace. 
The members of the WTO should reform their agreements to 
incorporate environmental protections and develop meaningful 
environmental provisions in regional free trade agreements like 
NAFTA.  Such agreements and provisions would establish 
international standards for the mining and mineral processing 
industries similar to a RCRA hardrock waste management program.  
A trade measure on metal goods imported to the United States from 
noncompliant countries (e.g., countries that do not establish and 
enforce similar waste management standards) could level the playing 
field. 
Sustainable development of the mining and mineral processing 
industry means using an integral approach and establishing 
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environmental and social policies and specific compliance standards 
that achieve a triple bottom line goal of protecting and preserving 
people, the planet, and prosperity.  Transformation of eighteenth 
century industrial behavior into twenty-first century sustainable 
development is essential for preserving the environment and 
protecting public health and welfare. 
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